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Over the past two decades, courts and commentators have often
treated the class action as though it were a monolith, limiting their
analysis to the particular class form that joins together a large number
of claims for monetary relief. This Article argues that the myopic
focus on the aggregated-damages class action has led to undertheorization of the other class-action subtypes, which serve far
different purposes and have far different effects, and has allowed the
ongoing backlash against the aggregated-damages class action to
affect the other subtypes in an undifferentiated manner. The failure to
confine this backlash to its intended target has had a negative impact
on the availability of the other class forms, harming the interests of
both litigants and the judiciary. In particular, in civil-rights cases
involving injunctive or declaratory relief, obstacles to class treatment
pose a threat to remedial efficacy and the rule of law. Courts,
lawmakers, and scholars should therefore engage in a broader
analysis that takes into account all of the subtypes set forth in the
modern class-action rule.
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INTRODUCTION
It has become a commonplace to say that the class action is
1
dying, or at least, that courts and lawmakers are trying to kill it. This

1. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005) (“[I]t is likely that, with a handful of
exceptions, class actions will soon be virtually extinct.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation
and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 516 (2013) (“Various
Cassandras over the past four decades have frequently, inaccurately, and repetitively reported
the class action’s death. . . . Class action litigation, it turns out, is hard to kill off.”); Jay
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Article argues that something different is going on: courts and
lawmakers are trying to rein in a specific type of class action, and in
the process, they are imposing unwarranted constraints on all of the
others.
The problem is one of square pegs and round holes, and it arises
2
from a myopic focus on the aggregated-damages class action, the
particular class form that aggregates a large number of monetary
claims into a single class-wide recovery. Myopia is not blindness, and
this problem has not arisen from a lack of knowledge on the part of
courts, lawmakers, or scholars. Those who deal with class actions in
their professional lives are aware that subtypes other than the
aggregated-damages class action exist, and when they explicitly
discuss those other class forms, they also recognize significant
differences among them. However, when they turn their attention to
perceived problems with the class-action device—and the appropriate
responses to those problems—their knowledge and recognition of the
other class forms tends to fall by the wayside. At that point, they tend
to focus almost entirely on the aggregated-damages class action.
In an aggregated-damages class action, the amount of the
recovery increases in connection with the number of people in the
class, a feature that is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand,
the scaling-up from individual to class-wide recoveries can create
economic viability where none existed before, by increasing the
potential contingency fee enough that the litigation becomes worth an
3
attorney’s time. On the other hand, the incentive to create everlarger classes can lead to unwieldy litigation, eyebrow-raising fees,
4
and confiscatory recoveries.
Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA’s World, 32 REV. LITIG. 691, 691 (2013) (“It is fashionable these
days to talk about the death of class actions.”).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
3. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very
core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A
class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into
something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))). It bears emphasis that the creation of economic
viability occurs only in negative-value class actions, that is, those in which the costs of individual
litigation exceed the potential for recovery. Some aggregated-damages class actions, however,
involve individual claims large enough to bring on their own. For those claims, rather than
serving a litigation-facilitating purpose, the aggregated-damages class action can promote values
of efficiency and uniformity. See infra Part I.B.
4. For discussion of the negative impacts of suboptimal class sizes, see generally David
Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and “Indivisible” Remedies, 79
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Over the past two decades, courts and commentators have been
arguing about the settlement pressure arising from class certification,
the massive fee awards received by class counsel, and the time and
5
expense required for class-action litigation, among other issues.
Disagreements tend to center on the extent to which the benefits of
class treatment justify these deviations from the asserted norms of
6
traditional bilateral litigation, rather than the question whether class
7
treatment in fact entails those deviations. This debate has led to a
series of restrictions on class treatment, as courts and lawmakers have
aimed for a better balance between the costs and benefits of allowing
8
the class action to achieve its litigation-facilitating purpose.
The class action, however, does not have a purpose; it has
9
purposes. The current debate largely fails to reflect the versatility of
the class action’s design. Consider the following examples:
Logically indivisible relief: Residents of New York City allege
that the city’s emergency-preparedness program fails to accommodate
the needs of persons with disabilities by, for example, failing to
adequately provide for the evacuation of persons with disabilities
10
from multistory buildings. The residents sue for an injunction to
change the program.
Limited funds: Hurricanes cause the levees in New Orleans to
break, leading to extensive flooding. Residents suffer hundreds of
millions of dollars in damages, but only about $21 million in insurance
11
funds is available to satisfy their claims. The residents sue to recover
their fair share of the funds.
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542 (2011); Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and the Optimal Class Action, 82 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 767 (2014).
5. See infra Part II.
6. For a discussion of the asserted norms of traditional bilateral litigation, see generally
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
7. Cf. Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1105, 1108 (2010) (criticizing the debate over class actions for “tend[ing] to convey the
impression that the world neatly divides itself into the mass effects unique to class actions and
the confined realm of litigation between individuals, each standing alone and each separately
represented”).
8. See infra Part III; see generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013) (arguing that by weakening plaintiffs’ ability to bring class-action
lawsuits, courts are undermining the efficiency, deterrence, and compensatory functions of the
class action).
9. See infra Part I.
10. See Brooklyn Ctr. for Indep. of the Disabled v. Bloomberg, 980 F. Supp. 2d 588, 595–96
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
11. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 189–90 (5th Cir. 2010).
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Civil rights: A mental health provider alleges that a California
law banning “sexual orientation change efforts” for minors (that is,
therapy designed to convert minors from homosexual to
heterosexual) violates his First Amendment rights. The provider sues
for an injunction prohibiting the statute’s enforcement, not only as to
12
him, but as to all others who provide such therapy.
Aggregated damages: Consumers in Ohio allege that a company
has sold them defective washing machines, which damage their
13
clothing and create unpleasant odors in their homes. The consumers
sue to recover the damages allegedly caused by the machines.
Plaintiffs may bring a class action in each of the foregoing
scenarios, but each situation entails a different justification for class
treatment and a different set of procedural needs. The class-action
rule thus contains a different provision, with different procedural
14
requirements, applicable to each: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15
23(b)(1)(A) for logically indivisible relief, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) for the
16
distribution of a limited fund, Rule 23(b)(2) for civil rights and
17
18
common conduct, and Rule 23(b)(3) for aggregated damages. For

12. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 2014).
13. See In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 844
(6th Cir. 2013).
14. In order to obtain certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the proposed class meets each of the four prerequisites
described in Rule 23(a), which consist of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation. Many courts also impose the implicit requirements that a definable class must
exist, and that the plaintiff must be a member of the class. 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:1 (5th ed. 2011); see also infra Part III.C (discussing the
“ascertainability” requirement for class certification). The plaintiff must also show that the
proposed class falls under at least one of the four subtypes described in Rule 23(b), which are
set forth in the text. Confusingly, Rules 23(a) and (b) differ in their numbering; although the
four prerequisites are set forth in (a)(1), (2), (3), and (4), the four subtypes are set forth in
(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and (b)(3). FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is
satisfied and if . . . prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would
create a risk of . . . inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class . . . .”).
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is
satisfied and if . . . prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would
create a risk of . . . adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical
matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual
adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests . . . .”).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied
and if . . . the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
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simplicity, I will refer to these subtypes as the logical-indivisibility,
limited-fund, injunctive civil-rights, and aggregated-damages class
19
actions, respectively. In contrast to the efficiency and litigation20
facilitating purposes of the aggregated-damages class action, the
logical-indivisibility subtype protects against inconsistent judgments,
the limited-fund subtype promotes the fair distribution of insufficient
resources, and the injunctive civil-rights subtype facilitates class-wide
21
relief for class-wide harms.
These subtypes came into being nearly a half century ago,
22
through revisions to Rule 23 that took effect in 1966. By then,
centuries of Anglo American case law had demonstrated a need for
devices like the logical-indivisibility and limited-fund subtypes as a
means of protecting judicial legitimacy and preventing unfairness to
23
litigants. Similarly, relatively recent experiences with desegregation
claims had demonstrated a need for a device like the injunctive civilrights subtype as a means of promoting the rule of law and securing
24
effective relief for large-scale harms. In contrast, the aggregateddamages class action reached beyond previous judicial experience to
encompass situations in which class treatment was “not as clearly
25
called for,” as the authors of the revisions put it. Although the other
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole . . . .”).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied
and if . . . the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”).
19. Note that, although I use these labels as shorthand, they do not capture the full range
of claims that each subtype can encompass. For example, although courts and scholars
sometimes refer to Rule 23(b)(2) as the civil-rights class action, its application is not limited to
any particular area of substantive law. In addition, in rare circumstances, courts have certified
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes in cases that do not involve the distribution of a limited fund. See 5
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.42[3][c] (3d ed. 1997); see also,
e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 85 F.R.D. 701 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (certifying a
class under 23(b)(1)(B) to adjudicate aboriginal rights). For a more detailed explanation of the
scope and origin of each subtype, see infra Parts I.A–B.
20. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text; see also infra Part I.B.
21. See infra Part I.A.
22. See infra Part I; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966
amendment.
23. See infra Parts I.A.1–2.
24. See infra Part I.A.3; see generally David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation
Litigation and its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011)
[hereinafter Marcus, Flawed but Noble] (arguing that prior desegregation actions played a role
in the drafting of the 1966 Rule 23 amendments).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
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subtypes were designed to capture the lessons of existing case law, the
aggregated-damages class action was an innovation, designed for
26
procedural flexibility and adaptation.
And adaptation did indeed occur. Incentivized by the promise of
sizable contingency fees, which were largely unavailable under the
other subtypes, plaintiffs’ lawyers turned their creative energies to the
aggregated-damages class action. They achieved great success, and by
the mid-1990s, courts certified more class actions under the
27
aggregated-damages subtype than any other. Yet even as the use of
the aggregated-damages class action has expanded, the need for the
other subtypes has remained—research suggests that about one third
of class actions involve subtypes other than the aggregated-damages
class action, with the injunctive civil-rights class action accounting for
28
a large majority of that subset. Moreover, due to the substantive
claims involved, those subtypes have an importance beyond their raw
numbers. The injunctive civil-rights class action, in particular, plays an
important role in the articulation and enforcement of constitutional
29
30
rights. The mandate of Brown v. Board of Education, for example,
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. As late as the mid-1980s, the injunctive civil-rights subtype accounted for most of the
class actions that achieved certification. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP
LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 246 (1987). A few years later, however, a largescale study of federal class-action activity demonstrated that “the world of class actions in 1995–
96 was primarily a world of Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions.” DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET
AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN 52 (2000); see also Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J.
Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 74, 94 (1996) (affirming this finding in a smaller-scale study). But see Judith Resnik,
Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and
Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 147 (2011) (noting that only limited data are available
about class-action litigation).
28. Willging et al., supra note 27, at 94; see also infra note 193 (noting that, among the
limited subset of interlocutory appeals from class certification decisions between November 30,
1998 and May 31, 2012, about 29 percent involved the injunctive civil-rights subtype). On the
one hand, if class treatment were more readily available, this proportion might well be higher.
See infra Part IV.C; see also Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, But Not for Thee: The Rise of
Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2024–37 (2015) (analyzing
plaintiffs’ structural incentives and disincentives to pursuing class treatment when challenging a
defendant’s generally applicable policy or practice). On the other hand, these studies took place
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes limited the types of
claims that could be pursued in an injunctive civil-rights class action, see infra note 138 and
accompanying text, which suggests that the proportion of such class actions might now be lower.
29. Carroll, supra note 28, at 2068–69; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and
Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 598 (2012) (arguing that class actions offer
important institutional advantages for the development of constitutional rights).
30. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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would have been more difficult to carry out if African American
students had to sue one by one to obtain admission to previously
31
segregated schools.
Not only does the current debate largely fail to reflect the
function and importance of subtypes other than the aggregated32
damages class action, but more important, it also has produced
across-the-board changes in class-action law that have made the
33
purposes of the other subtypes more difficult to achieve. Limitations
ranging from broadened appellate review of class-certification
34
decisions to heightened commonality under Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
35
Dukes have rendered the device inefficient or unavailable for some
of its least controversial uses, as a result of perceived problems that
36
may have little or nothing to do with those uses. Indeed, it is unclear
whether the paradigmatic post-Brown desegregation cases could be
37
certified as class actions under today’s restrictive standards.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the impact of these
undifferentiated restrictions on civil-rights litigation deserves
38
particular concern. Effective enforcement of civil-rights laws

31. By noting that it would have been more difficult without the class-action device, I do
not mean to imply that it was easy. Nor do I mean to imply that the work is done. See generally
GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT
PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT, AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE (May 15, 2014) (reviewing the
impact of desegregation efforts over the past sixty years).
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part III. “Myopia” implies inadvertence, and indeed, the initial creation of
these across-the-board changes has generally resulted from courts’ and scholars’ inattention,
rather than hostility, to the other subtypes. That initial inattention, however, creates room for
subsequent opportunism. For example, a court that doubts the legitimacy or goals of an
injunctive civil-rights case can rely on the broadly-stated holdings of prior aggregated-damages
cases to deny class treatment. See infra notes 290–96 and accompanying text.
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting
or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed
with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.”); see also infra Part III.A.
35. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); see also infra Part III.E.
36. Cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them: Rethinking the
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 439–40 (2014) (arguing that “[t]he ascendancy of
the damage class action has been accompanied by the panoply of problems that bring class
litigation into disrepute,” and that “[m]any of the class action harms that have developed
recently would be avoided with elimination of the damage class action from the rule”).
37. See infra notes 285–89 and accompanying text.
38. See Suzette Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455,
484–508 (2014) (noting that “the class action device . . . plays a special role in the civil rights
context” and explaining how civil-rights claimants “have been hit particularly hard by
increasingly restrictive applications and interpretations of Rule 23”). Cf. David Marcus, The
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depends on private litigation, as Congress recognized long ago. But
when only declaratory or injunctive relief is at issue, the private sector
40
generally lacks an economic incentive to bring such litigation, let
41
alone to do so on a class basis. Market forces thus suppress the
litigation of class actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief for
civil-rights violations. Increases in the transaction costs associated
with injunctive civil-rights class actions can only further suppress this
42
type of class litigation.
Recent cases brought under the injunctive civil-rights subtype
illustrate the harms that undifferentiated restrictions on class
43
treatment can cause. In some such cases, the denial of class
certification can prevent the courts from reaching the merits of
44
important issues. In others, it can increase the time and expense
involved in litigating those issues on a class basis, without a
45
corresponding benefit to the fairness or accuracy of the results.
Increases in the time and expense required for class litigation, in turn,
will lead some litigants to forego seeking class treatment in the first
instance; that choice can have negative consequences for judicial
economy, rights articulation, and other values that the judicial system
46
should promote. In order to prevent these harms and improve the
conceptual coherence of class-action law, courts, lawmakers, and
scholars should move beyond the prevailing myopia to undertake a

Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter, Marcus, Public Interest] (“Significant public interest cases have
recently run aground for failure to meet Rule 23’s requirements, in ways that would have been
nearly unimaginable a decade ago.”).
39. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968) (describing the
congressional intent underlying fee-shifting statutes).
40. Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 678 (2013).
41. Carroll, supra note 28, at 2073–74 (explaining that class-action status does not itself
increase the fee available under fee-shifting statutes).
42. Cf. Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 605–06 (1997) (discussing the effect of rising transaction costs on the
litigation rate of widely held claims). It bears noting that suppressing the class litigation of a
particular type of claim, such as civil rights, is often not the same as suppressing that type of
litigation overall. As explained infra Part IV.C, increases in the transaction costs associated with
class treatment will lead some plaintiffs to bring their claims on an individual rather than a class
basis, causing inefficiencies and other difficult institutional problems.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. See infra Part IV.A.
45. See infra Part IV.B.
46. See infra Part IV.C.

CARROLL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/22/2016 9:43 PM

852

[Vol. 65:843

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

broader analysis, one that takes into account all of the subtypes set
47
forth in the modern class-action rule.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes the origin and
structure of the modern class-action rule to demonstrate its
multifunctional design. Part II demonstrates the ways in which the
current class-action debate neglects the existence and function of
subtypes other than the aggregated-damages class action. Part III
examines the mismatch between this conceptually limited debate and
the across-the-board changes that it has produced. Part IV presents
case studies of the harms that the undifferentiated changes can cause,
and Part V identifies a set of approaches to mitigating and reversing
those harms.
I. THE NEGLECTED STRUCTURE OF THE CLASS-ACTION RULE
The class-action rule took on its current structure through
48
amendments that went into effect in 1966. By that time, American
courts had decades of experience with the prior version of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in addition to a much larger
49
body of Anglo American case law on aggregate litigation generally.
The authors of the 1966 amendments took the lessons of history into
50
account, but they did not allow that history to constrain them. They
created a new framework requiring that all class actions must satisfy
the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
51
adequacy of representation, and must also fit within one of four

47. See infra Part V. When referring to the “modern” class-action rule, I mean the
structure adopted in 1966, which introduced the subtypes set forth in Rule 23(b). FED. R. CIV. P.
23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 833 (1999) (explaining that “modern class action practice emerged in the 1966 revision of
Rule 23”).
48. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953–
1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2013) [hereinafter Marcus, History]; see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (replacing the original rule, which had
defined the categories of class actions “in terms of the abstract nature of the rights involved”).
49. See YEAZELL, supra note 27, at 238–50.
50. For example, because scholars had criticized the prior version of the rule for allowing
class members to opt into litigation after it became clear that the class would be successful, the
1966 authors determined that every certified class action would result in a judgment declaring
all members of the class to be bound. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966
amendment; Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204,
1225 (1966) (“The new rule eliminates the unfairness of what the Advisory Committee terms
one-way intervention by a spurious class member, who, under the old rule, could remain
uncommitted until the termination of the litigation.”).
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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52

class-action subtypes. As described below, three of the subtypes
represented an effort to codify a set of best practices that courts had
already developed, whereas the fourth marked an ambitious and
uncertain change in American civil procedure. It is that final category
that, over the past two decades, has driven the path of the class-action
rule as a whole.
A. Three Categories Rooted in Judicial Experience
Advisory Committee reporter Benjamin Kaplan, writing in the
year following the adoption of revised Rule 23, described the drafters’
approach to prior judicial experience with class actions as follows:
The Advisory Committee . . . perceived, as lawyers had for a long
time, that some litigious situations affecting numerous persons
“naturally” or “necessarily” called for unitary adjudication. . . .
Approaching rule 23, then . . . the Committee strove to sort out the
factual situations or patterns that had recurred in class actions and
appeared with varying degrees of convincingness to justify treatment
of the class in solido. The revised rule was written upon the
53
framework thus revealed . . . .

This analysis of recurring fact patterns resulted in the first three
categories described in the class-action rule: the logical-indivisibility
subtype set forth in Rule 23(b)(1)(A), the limited-fund subtype set
forth in Rule 23(b)(1)(B), and the injunctive civil-rights subtype set
54
forth in Rule 23(b)(2). These three subtypes are collectively known
as the “mandatory” class actions, because if a court certifies a class
action under one of these subtypes, class members do not have an
absolute right to decline membership in the class—that is, to “opt
55
out.” (In contrast, the aggregated-damages class action set forth in
52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
53. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386 (1967). Kaplan had a strong
leadership role in the drafting of the revisions to Rule 23. John P. Frank, Response to 1996
Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, in 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 262, 265
(1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/workingpapers-vol2pdf [http://perma.cc/9SJW-KMXK].
54. For an explanation of these labels, see supra note 19.
55. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 412 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he drafters of
Rule 23 found it unnecessary to provide (b)(1) and (b)(2) class members with the absolute right
to notice or to opt-out of the class . . . .”). But see 5 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 16:17 (4th ed. 2002) (“[C]ourts have the discretionary power to allow
exclusion in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions” but “generally courts have declined to
extend the exclusion rule to include these classes.”).
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Rule 23(b)(3) does provide an absolute right to opt out. ) Due to
their historical pedigrees, and because of the confusion that the term
57
“mandatory” can cause, I will refer to these three subtypes as the
“traditional” class actions.
1. Inconsistent Judgments and Rule 23(b)(1)(A). The Advisory
Committee began its search for the traditional class-action categories
by asking what would happen, in different factual scenarios, if more
58
than one potential claimant brought an individual lawsuit. In one
scenario that courts had repeatedly faced, individual actions by
multiple claimants created a risk of inconsistent judgments. The
problem arose when a defendant had to choose whether to take a
single, impersonal action with the potential to affect numerous other
59
people—for example, taking water from a stream, constructing a
60
61
building, or issuing a bond. The defendant’s conduct in such cases is
logically indivisible in the sense that it cannot possibly be modified as
62
to one plaintiff but not another. For example, a defendant cannot
take water from a particular stream so as to reduce the amount of
water available to one downstream landowner, yet leave the amount
of water available to another downstream landowner unchanged.
Similarly, a defendant cannot both construct and not construct a
particular building, or issue and not issue a particular bond.
Although the defendant in a case involving logical indivisibility
has no ability to take different actions toward different plaintiffs,

56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (creating an opt-out provision only for classes certified under
the aggregated-damages subtype). For this reason, courts and scholars sometimes refer to this
subtype as the “opt-out” class action. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
615 (1997) (“Rule 23(b)(3) ‘opt-out’ class actions superseded the former ‘spurious’ class
action . . . .”).
57. Some who hear the term “mandatory” take it to mean that, if a case falls into one of
these three categories, then the plaintiff has no choice but to bring it as a class action. As
explained infra Part IV.C, however, such a plaintiff does have a choice in the matter, and the
potential for a plaintiff to make an institutionally suboptimal choice should factor into the
development of class-action law.
58. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 387–88.
59. See Fleming v. Bennett, 116 P.2d 442, 444 (Cal. 1941); Kaplan, supra note 53, at 388.
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; Gart v.
Cole, 263 F.2d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1959).
61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment;
Maricopa Cty. Mun. Water Conservation Dist. No. One v. Looney, 219 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir.
1955).
62. In some cases, the indivisibility results from legal rather than logical constraints, as
when a utility is required by law to treat all customers alike. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 388.
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multiple claimants might individually possess the right to sue the
defendant over its conduct. In the absence of class treatment, this
potential for multiple lawsuits would present an adjudicatory problem
for both courts and litigants. A court might issue a decree requiring
the defendant to take an action different from that required by
another court’s decree. Defendants might thereby find themselves
subject to conflicting orders, or orders that simultaneously permitted
and prohibited the challenged conduct. It was this risk of inconsistent
judgments, and its negative consequences for judicial legitimacy, that
the authors of the 1966 revisions sought to avoid.
To address cases involving logically indivisible relief, the authors
of the 1966 revisions created Rule 23(b)(1)(A). The text of this
subtype explicitly sets forth its purpose of preventing inconsistent
judgments, providing for class treatment when “prosecuting separate
actions by or against individual class members would create a risk
of . . . inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct
63
for the party opposing the class.” The Advisory Committee
envisioned that the logical-indivisibility subtype would enable a
single, class-wide adjudication of the claimants’ rights and the
defendant’s duties, preserving judicial legitimacy and assuring the
64
possibility of compliance.
2. Depleted Resources and Rule 23(b)(1)(B). In creating the
logical-indivisibility subtype, the authors of the 1966 revisions
generally took a defendant’s perspective on the risks of individual
adjudications. In contrast, when they turned to the limited-fund
65
subtype, they took up the perspective of potential claimants. Here,
the risk to be avoided was that the adjudication of one claimant’s
rights would prejudice the interests of the others—for example, by
66
depleting the resources available to satisfy future judgments. Rule
67
19, which governs joinder of required parties, addresses the same
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
65. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 388–89.
66. Id. at 389. As noted, on rare occasions this subtype has been used when circumstances
other than the limited-fund scenario create this potential for intra-group prejudice. See supra
note 19.
67. Specifically, Rule 19(a)(1) states,
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the
court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if: (A) in that person’s
absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or (B) that
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risk on a smaller scale; not coincidentally, amendments to that rule
69
took effect simultaneously with the revisions to Rule 23.
At the time of the 1966 revisions, principles similar to those
70
captured in Rule 19 had already existed for centuries. Courts had
developed those principles to address recurring fact patterns,
including the limited-fund scenario, in which the externalities of an
71
individual case had the potential to harm similarly situated plaintiffs.
Just as the logical-indivisibility scenario involved the impossibility of
a defendant complying with incompatible standards of conduct, the
limited-fund scenario involved another problem of impossibility, one
that arose when a defendant would not be able to pay out all of the
72
judgments that could be entered against it.
Early limited-fund cases involved situations such as foreclosure
on a property subject to multiple mortgages and the distribution of a
73
decedent’s assets to his creditors. Those types of cases continued
into the modern era even as new forms, such as lawsuits seeking to
person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person’s absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations because of the interest.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1). Previous versions of the rule used different terminology, referring to
“necessary” and “indispensable” parties rather than “required” parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b)
(“When persons who are not indispensable . . . have not been made parties . . . the court shall
order them summoned . . . .”).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. Because required-party rules also address the risk of inconsistent
adjudications, they can be seen as precursors to both Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (B). See Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 1254, 1257–58 (1961) (discussing cases concerned with “avoidance of inconsistent
results”).
69. See Kaplan, supra note 53, at 389 (noting the relationship between amended Rule 19
and the criteria set forth in Rule 23(b)(1)); see also id. at 358–59 (demonstrating reliance on
Geoffrey Hazard’s work in amending Rule 19).
70. See generally Hazard, supra note 68, at 1257–58 (discussing seventeenth-century
decisions about necessary-party joinder, which courts justified for reasons including “avoidance
of a multiplicity of actions, assurance of adequate presentation of the issues and relevant
evidence, efficient use of judicial effort, and avoidance of inconsistent adjudication between
different parties to the transaction”).
71. See William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of
the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 722–23 (2006) (“[E]ach of the various
types of class cases can be understood as necessitated by the externalities of individual
litigation. . . . In a limited fund class case, for example, individual lawsuits produce spillover
effects on persons not parties: by depleting the defendant’s available resources, the early
individual cases harm later litigants.”).
72. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 361.
73. See Hazard, supra note 68, at 1256–70 (discussing seventeenth- through nineteenthcentury cases).
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divide insurance proceeds among those injured in an accident or
74
natural disaster, came into being. The thread tying the cases together
was the risk that the latest-in-time claimants might be left with no
recourse, despite having valid claims against the defendant, because
of the practical effects of judgments already entered in favor of
others.
In order to address that risk in cases involving large numbers of
75
claimants, the authors of the 1966 revisions created the limited-fund
subtype under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). By its terms, this subtype authorizes
class treatment when “prosecuting separate actions by or against
individual class members would create a risk of . . . adjudications with
respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would
be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their
76
ability to protect their interests.” The provision allows for the
equitable distribution of a limited fund through a single class
proceeding, eliminating the need for claimants to race to the
courthouse in order to secure relief.
3. Civil Rights and Rule 23(b)(2). The injunctive civil-rights class
action responded to a more recent set of cases, and a more immediate
set of concerns, than the other two traditional class forms discussed
above. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, civil-rights plaintiffs
77
attempted to bring a number of cases on a class basis. In many
cases—most famously, Brown v. Board of Education—they
succeeded in obtaining class treatment and correspondingly broad
78
orders for relief. Often this breadth occurred in spite of the
74. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litigation, 628 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2010)); see also Kaplan, supra note 53, at 371–75 (discussing
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty, 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir.
1966), vacated sub. nom. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102
(1968)).
75. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 364–65. As noted, simultaneous reforms to Rule 19 addressed
such risks in cases involving fewer claimants. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
77. See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 678–95 (categorizing the three periods
of increased desegregation litigation as the few years before Brown v. Board of Education, the
five years after Brown, and the early 1960’s); Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some
Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 468 (1960) (“The class action has recently been
used extensively in the field of civil liberties . . . .”).
78. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“[P]laintiffs and others similarly
situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained
of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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formalistic requirements imposed by the pre-1966 version of the classaction rule, which appeared to prevent class-wide remedies in
79
desegregation cases. Some judges, “[i]gnoring doctrinal constraints
altogether . . . signaled that plaintiffs’ judgments in desegregation
class actions would benefit all black schoolchildren included in the
80
class definition,” even though the rule required a different result.
Other courts, however, refused to allow class treatment for
81
desegregation and other civil-rights claims. Especially during the
post-Brown period of Southern intransigence, many courts and
legislatures engaged in legal strategies designed to limit the reach of
82
the decision. These judicial and legislative strategies were mutually
reinforcing: judges interpreted Brown as a prohibition on de jure
discrimination rather than a requirement of integration, and
legislatures “replaced de jure policies of segregation with mechanisms
that purported to treat blacks as individuals but invariably produced
83
the same segregated results.” For example, some states enacted
pupil-assignment laws that allowed school boards to conduct an
individualized, multiple-factor assessment of each student’s
84
appropriate school placement. These replacement policies made
dissimilarities within a potential class of African American students
theoretically relevant to the class-certification analysis, and thus
85
defeated requests for class treatment.

This is not to minimize the difficulties that civil-rights plaintiffs faced in securing enforcement of
that relief. See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) (noting that, more than
thirteen years after Brown was decided, no white children and 85 percent of the African
American children were attending one of the two schools in a defendant school district);
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 146–49 (5th ed. 2004) (describing
resistance to desegregation in the decade following the Brown decision).
79. See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 681–83 (“Individual litigant
preferences were theoretically relevant, even in cases challenging de jure, blanket policies
because formally Fourteenth Amendment rights were several. But courts tended not to let
abstract jural relationships alone hamstring class suits, taking a more realistic view of what these
suits put at issue.”).
80. Marcus, History, supra note 48, at 601.
81. Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 681–91. Some courts “emphasized the
theoretical possibility, rather than the practical likelihood, that preferences among class
members might diverge, and they refused class treatment on these grounds.” Id. at 683. Others
“denied class treatment on grounds that individuals alone could choose when or how to
vindicate their Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Id. at 685.
82. Id. at 683–86.
83. Id. at 683.
84. Id. at 684.
85. Id. at 685–86.
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The unavailability of class treatment created serious problems
for civil-rights plaintiffs. It could prevent them from obtaining any
decision on the merits of their claims; for example, a school
desegregation case might drag on until the individual plaintiffs had
86
graduated, rendering the action moot. It could create additional
obstacles to compliance; for example, even if an individual case did
result in a broad remedial order, the intended beneficiaries might find
87
themselves unable to enforce it because of their status as nonparties.
Most important, it could result in an order so narrow as to be
meaningless—many judges at that time refused to grant system-wide
88
relief to individual litigants in civil-rights cases. Some courts, upon
holding that a desegregation plaintiff had proved his claim, would
refuse to order any remedy beyond the admission of that one African
89
American student to an otherwise all-white school. That remedial
approach could result in integration only after multiple lawsuits and
great expense.
The creation of the injunctive civil-rights subtype can best be
90
understood against this societal backdrop. Although the modern
version of Rule 23 took effect in 1966, the authors began work on the
91
revisions several years earlier. As Advisory Committee member
John Frank explained, those revision efforts proceeded “in direct
parallel to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the race relations echo of
92
that decade was always in the committee room.” The drafters were
well aware of the hurdles facing civil-rights plaintiffs in unsympathetic
93
and hostile courts, as well as the inadequate relief that many of those

86. Id. at 679.
87. Id. at 679–80.
88. Id. at 680.
89. Id. at 710 (“The Fifth Circuit did not sanction an integration injunction in an individual
suit until 1963, and regardless of this decision, recalcitrant district judges still cited a suit’s
nonclass status to justify meaningless, individual-by-individual injunctions.” (footnote omitted)).
90. Cf. YEAZELL, supra note 27, at 21 (arguing that “[s]ocial context matters” to the
understanding of procedural rules, especially those involving group litigation).
91. Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670 n.31 (1979) (“Although not
promulgated until 1966, the basic text of the current rule actually was drafted by the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules in 1961 and 1962 . . . . [A]s a practical matter the contours of the new
rule had become firm by 1964.”).
92. Frank, supra note 53, at 266.
93. For example, Dave Marcus recounts that in a letter to the principal author of the 1966
revisions, Advisory Committee member Charles Alan Wright
described a recent case where a well-known segregationist judge had denied class
treatment, then limited the injunction desegregating the defendant’s bus lines to the
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94

litigants obtained from individual-by-individual injunctions. This
mismatch between remedy and harm had negative consequences not
only for the other affected individuals, but also for judicial legitimacy
95
and the rule of law.
With the need for system-wide responses to civil-rights claims
96
specifically in mind, the authors of the 1966 revisions created Rule
23(b)(2), which applies when “the party opposing the class has acted
or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
97
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” As the authors noted,
this subtype allows a court to “settl[e] the legality of the [defendant’s]
98
behavior with respect to the class as a whole,” rather than through
piecemeal litigation. If the court decides in favor of the class, all class
members can rely on the resulting injunction or declaration. If the
court decides in favor of the defendant, all class members are bound
to that result.

three named plaintiffs. Given how this judge manipulated procedure to achieve an
unjust end, Wright argued, “[i]t is absolutely essential to the progress of integration
that such suits be treated as class actions, with the judgment binding on all members
of the class.”
Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 704–05 (alteration in original); see also Marcus,
History, supra note 48, at 608 (noting “Rule 23’s use as an aid to desegregation lawsuits, the only
real tool for civil rights enforcement before the 1964 Civil Rights Act”).
94. Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 710.
95. YEAZELL, supra note 27, at 258 (arguing that the injunctive civil-rights subtype
“expresses a strong preference, on grounds of seemliness, for consistency of outcome when
similarly situated persons are involved” and reflects the drafters’ view of “the necessity of the
legal order”); Carroll, supra note 28, at 2033; see also William B. Rubenstein, Procedure and
Society: An Essay for Steve Yeazell, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 136, 136 (2013) (introducing
the concept of “social loyalty,” which provides that the shape of litigation should correspond to
the “shape of the social activity that gave rise to [it]”).
96. Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A
Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 294 (2014) (“The Committee’s motivation, in
significant part, was to create a receptive procedural vehicle for the explosion of civil rights
cases that followed the Supreme Court’s seminal 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education . . . .”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment
(“Illustrative [of situations to which Rule 23(b)(2) would apply] are various actions in the civilrights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one
whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.”).
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
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B. A Fourth Category “Deliberately Created”
The final subtype created by the 1966 revisions, unlike the other
three, did not result from the lessons of judicial experience with
aggregate litigation. Nor did it result from the Advisory Committee’s
99
search for the categories of “natural” class actions. Rather, it
represented “a new category deliberately created,” and an
100
“innovation[],” as its principal author described it. This subtype, the
aggregated-damages class action, applies when “the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
101
adjudicating the controversy.”
Rule 23(b)(3) enables a representative plaintiff to bring a class
action based on an aggregation of multiple damages claims. The
Advisory Committee stated that classes certified under the
aggregated-damages subtype could “achieve economies of time,
effort, and expense,” as well as “promote[] uniformity of decision as
to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness
102
or bringing about other undesirable results.” Alternatively, by
offering the potential for a larger overall recovery and thus a larger
103
contingency fee, this subtype can create an economic incentive to
litigation where none existed before. As Jack Weinstein wrote several
years after the new rule’s adoption, “[m]atters which would not have
104
been litigated can now be brought to court.” These efficiency and

99. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 387.
100. Id. at 399. The Supreme Court, many years later, referred to Rule 23(b)(3) as “‘the
most adventuresome’ innovation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The rule goes on to describe “[t]he matters pertinent to these
findings” of predominance and superiority, which includes
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense
of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Id.
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
103. The sometime and uncertain inclusion of monetary damages claims in Rule 23(b)(2)
class actions offers some potential for plaintiffs’ attorneys to secure a contingency fee through
the injunctive civil-rights subtype, but that potential is limited by the requirement that such
damages must be “incidental” to other forms of relief. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131
S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
104. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the “Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
299, 300 (1973).
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litigation-generating purposes contrast sharply with the other
subtypes’ focus on avoiding the unfair or unworkable outcomes of
105
individual litigation.
The authors of the 1966 revisions had doubts as to whether they
should include the aggregated-damages class action in their changes
106
to Rule 23. The Advisory Committee’s Note described the subtype
in remarkably tentative terms, noting that “[i]n the situations to
which this subdivision relates, class-action treatment is not as clearly
called for as in those described above, but it may nevertheless be
107
convenient and desirable depending upon the particular facts.” In
an article published in the year after the rule’s adoption, Benjamin
108
Kaplan assured readers that “(b)(3) is well confined,” and that it
“invites a close look at the case before it is accepted as a class action
109
and even then requires that it be specially treated.” That special
treatment includes express judicial findings of predominance and
superiority, as well as notice and opt-out rights for members of the
class—procedural protections not required under the other
110
subtypes.
Notwithstanding these additional protections, the aggregateddamages class action became the focus of criticism and controversy
111
from the start. Moreover, although the authors of the 1966 revisions
112
had envisioned a more limited use for the new subtype, the
plaintiffs’ bar increasingly recognized the possibilities it presented for
economic rewards, and they attempted to bring class actions in areas

105. As Bill Rubenstein has described it, the aggregated-damages subtype aims to produce
positive externalities, whereas the other subtypes aim to prevent negative externalities.
Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 722–23.
106. Frank, supra note 53, at 267 (“[T]he most sharply disputed question [among members
of the Advisory Committee] was whether to have Rule (b)(3) at all.”).
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
108. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 395.
109. Id. at 390.
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
111. As Kaplan noted, “[c]riticism of the draft new rule started with the suggestion that the
rule should confine itself to the more ‘standard’ class actions of (b)(1) and (2) and stay out of
the difficult terrain of (b)(3).” Kaplan, supra note 53, at 394. He rejected that “timid course” as
“unthinkable.” Id. Later, he defended the need for the aggregated-damages subtype in terms of
the class action’s “historic mission of taking care of the smaller guy.” Marvin E. Frankel,
Amended Rule 23 from a Judge’s Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 299 (1966) (recounting
a conversation between Frankel and Kaplan).
112. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (expressing
the expectation that “mass accident” cases would not be appropriate for class-action
certification).
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Unsurprisingly,
ranging from mass torts to consumer claims.
114
defendants resisted these efforts, and before long, “segments of the
115
bench and bar [were] waging a holy war” over the class-action rule.
Stories of class counsel engaging in “undesirable or unprofessional
conduct” became commonplace, notwithstanding objections that such
116
“abuse does not appear to have been widespread,” and that “to the
extent there are difficulties they center around . . . class actions under
rule 23(b)(3), rather than actions under subdivision (b)(1) or
117
(b)(2).”
Due in large part to the creativity of the plaintiffs’ bar with
regard to the aggregated-damages subtype, the other subtypes now
represent a minority of class actions. But they are a significant
118
minority, not only in number, but also in importance.
The
conditions that created a need for the traditional subtypes, having
existed for decades or even centuries, have not suddenly disappeared.
As the next Part explains, however, those subtypes have played a
nearly invisible role in the development of class-action law over the
past two decades.
II. THE LIMITED TERMS OF THE CLASS-ACTION DEBATE
Courts and commentators have long weighed the costs and
benefits of the class-action device when debating its appropriate level
119
of availability. In its current form, that debate involves vigorous
disputes over issues relating to settlement pressure, attorney
overcompensation, and the expense and delay associated with class

113. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 1, at 521 (“The dominant legal debate of the 1980s and
1990s focused on the use of the class action to resolve mass tort litigation.”). For a discussion of
an aggregated-damages class action brought under consumer-protection laws, see supra note 13
and accompanying text.
114. See Benjamin Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2127 (1989)
(“[I]t did not escape attention at the time [of the 1966 revisions] that [Rule 23(b)(3)] would
open the way to the assertion of many, many claims that otherwise would not be pressed; so the
rule would stick in the throats of establishment defendants.”).
115. Miller, supra note 91, at 664.
116. Id. at 666–67.
117. Id. at 667 n.18.
118. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
119. Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 572 (2013) (“The standard
answer toward which most scholars in the debate gravitate balances the costs against the
benefits; although different scholars weigh the costs and benefits differently (and hence come to
different conclusions about the proper breadth of modern class actions), the methodology is the
same . . . .”).
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treatment, among other topics. Over the past two decades, the class
120
action’s proponents and opponents alike have tended to frame these
disputes in a manner that neglects the existence of the logicalindivisibility, limited-fund, and injunctive civil-rights class-action
subtypes.
It bears noting that the following analysis does not depend on
whether the concerns described below are well taken in the context of
121
the aggregated-damages class action. I will note my view, however,
that these concerns have varying degrees of validity and import within
that context. Arguments that plaintiffs’ counsel in aggregateddamages class actions are overcompensated, for example, are often
overstated (especially when unaccompanied by any inquiry into the
compensation received by defense counsel), whereas concerns about
the settlement pressure arising from certification of an aggregateddamages class sometimes carry more weight (especially as a
justification for interlocutory appeals from class-certification
decisions). My purpose in this Part is not to take a position with
respect to these disputes in the context of the aggregated-damages
class action. Rather, my argument is that even if one agrees that each
of these concerns justifies restricting the availability of the
aggregated-damages class action, the justification (as currently
articulated and examined) does not extend to restrictions on the other
122
subtypes.

120. For simplicity, I refer to those who generally favor greater availability of class
treatment as proponents of the class action, and those who generally favor greater restrictions as
its opponents. In some ways this is an oversimplification, but in others it represents a true divide
in the political and scholarly debate. See Resnik, supra note 27, at 145–48.
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). For an argument that does depend on the validity of concerns
about the aggregated-damages class action, see Mullenix, supra note 36, at 440. Mullenix
expresses concern about the ascendancy of the aggregated-damages class action, id. at 428, and
argues that a juridical “category creep” (similar, but not equivalent, to the myopia that I
describe here) “has significantly undermined the utility of these different [Rule 23(b)] class
categories,” id. at 426. In light of her view that a great deal of the criticism of the aggregateddamages class action is warranted, she “advocates a return to a simpler class action rule limited
to injunctive relief cases, with abandonment of the Rule 23(b)(3) damage class action.” Id. at
405. In contrast, I argue here that the purposes and effects of Rule 23(b)(3) should be
distinguished from those of the other class forms, not that the aggregated-damages provision
should be abolished. See infra Part V.B.
122. At the same time, examining these concerns in the context of the other subtypes may
reveal ways in which they fall short even for a subset of aggregated-damages class actions. See
infra Part II.C.
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A. Settlement Pressure
Those who favor greater restrictions on class actions often raise
123
124
the specter of “blackmail” or “in terrorem” settlements, in which a
defendant pays to settle a case not because of its merits, but because
class certification has increased the stakes of the litigation beyond
125
what the defendant can bear. Scholars raised concerns about
126
settlement pressure as early as 1971, but the issue did not gain
widespread traction until 1995, when the Seventh Circuit decided In
127
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. In that influential opinion, Judge
Posner expressed his concern that class certification could
“forc[e] . . . defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a
single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle
128
even if they have no legal liability.” In the intervening years, the
notion that judges should guard against uses of the class action that
result in irresistible settlement pressure has gained credence among
129
courts and scholars.

123. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]lass
certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle . . . . These settlements
have been referred to as judicial blackmail.” (citations omitted)).
124. See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that
aggregated damages in class actions could create “an in terrorem effect on defendants, which
may induce unfair settlements”).
125. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2002)
(arguing that class treatment “makes the case so unwieldy, and the stakes so large, that
settlement becomes almost inevitable—and at a price that reflects the risk of a catastrophic
judgment as much as, if not more than, the actual merit of the claims”).
126. Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (“Any device
which is workable only because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to
compel settlement is not a rule of procedure—it is a form of legalized blackmail.”); see also
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 120 (1973) (coining the term “blackmail
settlement”).
127. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
128. Id. at 1299.
129. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (“Other
courts have noted the risk of ‘in terrorem’ settlements that class actions entail . . . .”); Robert G.
Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1254
(2002) (“Loose certification standards risk high costs by inviting frivolous class action suits that
defendants settle rather than face potentially crippling, even bankrupting, damage awards.”);
Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions:
Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2000) (examining possible
procedural solutions to the problem of certification-induced settlement pressure); Richard A.
Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration,
and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1878 (2006) (“This is not to say that class settlement
pressure is absent from such cases, only that the law should not regard it as objectionable.”).
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Of course, the blackmail thesis also has its critics: courts and
scholars have questioned it on both empirical and normative
130
grounds. Some have pointed to the lack of evidence that defendants
actually experience bet-the-company levels of settlement pressure
because of class certification, or that settlements in fact result from
certification-induced pressure, as opposed to pressure arising from
131
the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. Others have argued that courts
have no authority to consider settlement pressure as a factor in
certification decisions, as no such provision appears in the class-action
132
rule. Finally, some have disputed that there is anything unfair about
the increased settlement pressure associated with class certification,
133
as it results only from the scope of the defendant’s own activity.
Notwithstanding the disagreements between them, both sides of
this debate start from the assumption that class certification does in
fact increase the stakes involved in the litigation, in the sense of
increasing the total amount that the defendant would have to pay if it
lost the case. To be sure, this assumption will always hold true for the
aggregated-damages class action, because the joining together of
multiple monetary claims necessarily increases the defendant’s
potential liability. Whatever the size of the claims, summing up two
monetary values produces a total greater than either one taken alone.
What has gone largely unnoticed, however, is that the
assumption of increased liability often does not hold true for subtypes
134
other than the aggregated-damages class action. For example, the
130. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1494 (2013) (showing that courts inconsistently accept settlements of meritless claims
despite criticizing the tendency of class actions to blackmail defendants); Charles Silver, “We’re
Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (arguing
that the blackmail thesis lacks a persuasive normative explanation).
131. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 130, at 1359 (“The authors of a Federal Judicial Center
study doubt that ‘the certification decision itself, as opposed to the merits of the underlying
claims, coerce[s] settlements with any frequency.’”). But see Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the
Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 524
(1991) (contending that securities settlements do not reflect the merits of the case).
132. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004); Lahav, supra note 130, at
1513.
133. See Lahav, supra note 130, at 1519 (contending that class actions allow the plaintiff
class to “stand on equal footing with an organizational defendant with the same capacity to
pursue a lawsuit,” which the class members could not do as individuals); Silver, supra note 130,
at 1366 (noting that a defendant’s decision to settle for fear of losing at trial “is a reason for
thinking the defendant is right to settle, not for thinking the defendant is coerced”).
134. For a notable exception, see Robert G. Bone, Sorting Through the Certification
Muddle, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 105, 113 (2010) (arguing that “the amount of improper
leverage certification creates . . . is likely to vary with the type of class action involved”).
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very nature of logically indivisible relief is that the remedy available
to a single claimant is the same as the remedy available to a group of
135
claimants. No matter whether one or many residents seek a
particular change in a city’s emergency-preparedness plan, the cost of
making that change will remain the same; no matter whether one or
many customers request that a restaurant build a wheelchair ramp,
the cost of building that ramp will not change; no matter whether one
or many neighbors complain about the fumes emanating from a hot
sauce plant, the cost of containing the fumes will not be affected. In
these types of cases, although many factors may affect the defendant’s
potential liability, the mere fact of class treatment does not. The same
136
is true of limited-fund class actions, which are available only when
factors unrelated to the litigation limit the amount of money the
137
defendant might be required to pay.
Prior to 2011, the link between certification and settlement
pressure was more complicated in cases brought pursuant to the
injunctive civil-rights subtype. At that time, courts routinely included
claims for individualized monetary relief in classes certified under
Rule 23(b)(2), creating a scaling-up effect similar to that involved in
aggregated-damages class actions. In its 2011 decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, however, the Supreme Court held that the
members of a class certified under the injunctive civil-rights subtype
138
could not seek individualized monetary relief.
Accordingly,
although litigants may seek certification of an aggregated-damages
class contemporaneously with certification of an injunctive civil-rights
class, the latter should not itself entail the aggregation of
individualized monetary claims.
To be sure, a defendant may well face pressure to settle a case
that does not involve the aggregation of monetary claims. The cost of
implementing an injunction, for example, may reach into the millions

135. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2010).
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
137. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (“[A]pplicants for contested
certification on this rationale must show the fund is limited by more than the agreement of the
parties . . . .”).
138. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–60 (2011). In addition to this
holding about Rule 23(b)(2) and claims for individualized monetary relief, the Wal-Mart Court
issued a holding addressing commonality, as discussed infra Part III.E.
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of dollars. In contrast to the aggregated-damages class action,
however, for which the cost of the remedy necessarily increases with
140
the number of people in the class, the cost of a system-wide
injunction will often be independent of the size or existence of the
141
class. The cost of such an injunction depends on the expense
associated with changing the defendant’s generally applicable
conduct, rather than the expense associated with delivering an
individualized remedy to each class member. Moreover, even when
logically indivisible relief is not at issue, a court might award systemwide relief to an individual plaintiff, further attenuating the
142
relationship between class treatment and remedial cost.
Accordingly, although subtypes other than the aggregated-damages
class action can involve significant settlement pressure, class
treatment is not usually the source of that pressure.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the connection between
class certification and settlement pressure requires separate analysis
under each class-action subtype. But courts and scholars have
generally failed to recognize the need for this differentiated
analysis—class-action myopia has instead led the debate to proceed
on the basis of mere assumptions, which remain unexamined precisely
because they hold true in the context of the aggregated-damages
subtype. Indeed, scholarship discussing certification-induced
settlement pressure has routinely neglected even to mention that the

139. See, e.g., Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 491 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting
that the injunction ordered by the district court would cost millions of dollars to implement); see
also infra Part IV.A (discussing the appellate decision in Jamie S.).
140. For discussion of this scaling-up effect from individual to class-wide remedies in the
context of the aggregated-damages class action, see supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
141. Exceptions exist in which the number of class members will directly increase the cost of
an injunction. For example, enjoining the collection of a tax from all taxpayers will cost
proportionally more than enjoining it only as to an individual plaintiff. Cf. Richards v. Jefferson
Cty., 517 U.S. 793 (1996). However, exceptions also exist in which the direct economic cost of a
class-wide remedy will be less than the direct economic cost of individual relief. For example, in
Klayman v. Obama, the district court ordered the National Security Agency (NSA) to stop
collecting telephone metadata only as to two individual plaintiffs. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C.
2013). The NSA would thus continue to incur the costs of operating the metadata program, and
to take additional actions to identify and disaggregate the information specific to those two
individuals, id. at 43 n.70, as opposed to terminating the program altogether.
142. Most of the recent litigation about marriage rights for same-sex couples, for example,
has proceeded on a nonclass basis yet has resulted in state-wide remedial orders. See, e.g.,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013) (noting that the District Court declared
Proposition 8 unconstitutional, enjoined its enforcement by the California officials named as
defendants, and directed those officials not to permit its enforcement by anyone under their
control or supervision).
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143

other subtypes exist. Thus, although the debate over settlement
pressure purports to be a debate about the class action writ large, on
its current terms it amounts to a debate only about the aggregateddamages class action.
B. Attorney Overcompensation
The myopic focus on the aggregated-damages class action is not
limited to disputes over settlement pressure, as disagreements over
compensation for class counsel demonstrate. On one side of this
disagreement, those who would limit the availability of the class
action argue that plaintiffs’ counsel receive excessive attorney’s fees
144
in class litigation. Members of the public tend to agree: “[P]ublic
attitudes about plaintiffs’ class action lawyers have often been
145
strongly negative,” fueled in large part by stories of attorneys who
receive huge contingency fees while class members receive little to no
146
monetary relief.
As with settlement pressure, scholars have responded to the
charges of overcompensation both empirically and normatively. Some
have noted that, contrary to political rhetoric and popular belief,
attorney’s fees for class counsel have not in fact increased over time,
and that “[f]ees and costs decline as a percent of the recovery as the
recovery amount increases, suggesting the efficiency of this form of
147
aggregate litigation.” Others have pointed to the deterrent function
of class litigation, arguing that attorney compensation needs to be
148
high enough to encourage class actions that deter harmful conduct.

143. See generally Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 129 (analyzing the blackmail charge in the
context of Rule 23(b)(3)); Silver, supra note 130 (analyzing the blackmail charge largely in the
context of Rule 23(b)(3), but including a reference to a particular limited-fund class action
decision).
144. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 15.
145. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 117–18 (noting
that courts and lawmakers have also expressed negative views of class counsel).
146. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
2043, 2043–44 (2010) (“Class action lawyers are some of the most frequently derided players in
our system of civil litigation. The focus of this ire is usually the ‘take’ that class action lawyers
receive from class action settlements.”).
147. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action
Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 281 (2010); see also Fitzpatrick, supra
note 146, at 2045–46 (noting that the percentage fee received by class counsel is lower on
average than the typical contingency fee in an individual case).
148. Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 2046–47.

CARROLL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/22/2016 9:43 PM

870

[Vol. 65:843

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

At times, this discussion looks like an argument over who is the
fatter cat, with the class action’s opponents pointing to class counsel
who reap huge fee awards (despite doing little to earn them), and its
proponents pointing to companies that reap huge profits (despite
149
engaging in harmful activity). Nonprofit public-interest lawyers
seldom appear as characters in this drama. Just as the phrase “class
action” is unlikely to make most people think of Brown v. Board of
150
Education, the phrase “class-action lawyer” is unlikely to make
them think of Thurgood Marshall. Yet Brown was no less a class
action than the consumer or securities cases that might come to mind,
and Marshall was no less a class-action lawyer than the attorneys who
bring those cases.
More generally, what the compensation debate neglects to
recognize is that some class actions cannot generate huge contingency
fees, or indeed any contingency fees, because they do not seek
monetary relief. For example, consider class actions seeking only
151
injunctive or declaratory relief pursuant to the civil-rights subtype.
Such actions can yield a court-ordered attorney’s fee only if a fee152
shifting statute applies.
Even then, absent exceptional
circumstances, class counsel will at most receive a reasonable hourly
153
rate for the hours reasonably spent on the litigation; the typical
award will fall below counsel’s market rate for hours actually
154
worked. Indeed, many successful cases covered by a fee-shifting
149. This aspect of the class-action debate thus resembles political discussions of litigation
and litigiousness in the early 1990s, when Republicans tried to focus the conversation on greedy
“trial lawyers” and Democrats aimed to redirect it to “well-heeled corporate interests.” See
Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two
Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1757–62 (2013).
150. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954) (deciding four consolidated class
actions from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware).
151. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
152. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 267–68 (1975) (holding
that prevailing parties in federal litigation can recover their attorney’s fees only through
statutory authorization); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012) (permitting a prevailing party to
recover a reasonable attorney’s fee in litigation brought pursuant to enumerated civil-rights
statutes).
153. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 1673 (2010) (holding that enhancing
attorney’s fees will only be allowed in “rare” and “exceptional” circumstances). Fee awards
cannot be adjusted to reflect the contingent nature of the fee. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505
U.S. 557, 567 (1992).
154. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, The Supreme Court’s Denial of Reasonable Attorney’s
Fees to Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535 (1990)
(describing the economic hardship that civil-rights plaintiffs’ attorneys endure due to fee
restrictions). Courts can refuse to compensate the attorneys for the hours actually worked if
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155

statute will yield no fee at all. As with settlement pressure,
compensation issues play out differently in the context of each classaction subtype, but the current class-action debate fails to recognize
or account for those differences.
C. Delay and Expense
The same unrecognized limitation affects discussions of the delay
and expense associated with the class-action device. Critics complain
that class proceedings cost too much and take too long, with the effect
of clogging court dockets, delaying relief to class members, and
156
miring defendants in protracted litigation.
The class action’s
proponents largely concede that class proceedings consume more
time and money than nonclass litigation, but argue that those
additional costs are necessary to ensure that absent class members
157
will be protected and that the necessary deterrence will be achieved.
The underlying assumption, on both sides, is that class actions are
more expensive and time-consuming because they are class actions.
they deem the reported time unreasonable; for example, they may determine that a firm
assigned more attorneys than necessary for a particular assignment, or that an attorney working
on an assignment took more time than it should have required. In addition, “the product of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate” must be
reduced based on the “degree of success obtained” in the litigation, “even where the plaintiff’s
claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 436 (1983).
155. For example, if a defendant makes a settlement offer that includes a waiver of
attorney’s fees, the plaintiff’s attorney may be ethically obligated to accept it on the client’s
behalf. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (approving such offers); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (requiring an attorney to “abide by a client’s
decision whether to settle a matter”); see also Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2008) (discussing the impact of Evans v. Jeff D. on feeshifting plaintiffs). Alternatively, if a defendant moots the case by unilaterally changing its
conduct in the manner the plaintiff requested, the court will award no fees. Buckhannon Bd. &
Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001); see
generally Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087
(2007) (discussing the impact of Buckhannon on fee-shifting plaintiffs).
156. See, for example, the discussion of the expense and delay involved in class proceedings
in the Supreme Court’s recent decisions interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (“[T]he switch from bilateral to
class arbitration . . . sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final
judgment.” (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011))); StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2010) (noting that class
arbitrations are less likely than bilateral arbitrations to receive the benefits of “lower costs,
greater efficiency and speed”); see also infra Part III.D.
157. See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The assumption of increased time and effort holds true for the
negative-value aggregated-damages class action, because in the
158
absence of class treatment, little to no litigation would in fact occur.
Beyond that context, however, the issue becomes much murkier. To
be sure, class certification proceedings take up courts’ and litigants’
159
time, and are not required in a nonclass case. Yet the effect of those
proceedings, when certification is granted, is to collapse multiple
lawsuits (whether actual or potential) into one. More important, to
the extent that the question is whether to increase the obstacles to
class treatment, it must focus on postcertification delay and expense.
Certification-related delay and expense would otherwise lead to
obstacles that further increase certification-related delay and expense
in an endless, one-way ratchet.
In terms of post-certification delay and expense, the class-action
device can enable some lengthy and expensive litigation, involving
extensive briefing and discovery. However, it also can enable the
efficient, class-wide resolution of a purely legal question, involving no
160
discovery at all. For example, in Doe v. Marion County, the plaintiff
brought an injunctive civil-rights class action challenging, on First
Amendment grounds, an Indiana statute that prohibited registered
sex offenders from using social-networking websites. He filed his
complaint on June 27, 2012, and the Seventh Circuit resolved the
“single legal question” presented by the case only nineteen months
161
later, on January 23, 2013.
Moreover, some of the “big” injunctive civil-rights class actions
would be resource-intensive even if they proceeded on a nonclass
basis. Consider California prison litigation. Before there was
162
Coleman/Plata,
a massive and ongoing pair of class actions
163
addressing prison overcrowding, there was Johnson v. California, a
nonclass case addressing inmate segregation. Although the latter
158. A negative-value class action is one in which the expected costs of litigation exceed the
expected monetary recovery. As noted, the application of the aggregated-damages class action
is not limited to negative-value claims. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
159. See Carroll, supra note 28, at 2063–65 (discussing the effect of certification burdens on
plaintiffs’ incentives and disincentives to pursuing class treatment).
160. Doe v. Marion Cty., 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013).
161. Id. at 697.
162. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v.
Plata (like the decision of the three-judge district court below) encompassed two class actions:
Coleman v. Brown, which involves prisoners with serious mental disorders, and Plata v. Brown,
which involves prisoners with serious medical conditions. See id. at 1922.
163. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
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proceeded in the absence of class treatment, it nonetheless consumed
over a decade of courts’ and litigants’ time, and it resulted in a state164
wide, structural consent decree.
In some types of cases, class treatment can actually save both
time and money, accelerating the provision of relief to the claimants.
165
For example, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the litigants attempted to
166
settle asbestos litigation under the limited-fund subtype. When the
167
case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the entire Court agreed that
“the elephantine mass of asbestos cases . . . defies customary judicial
168
administration.” The defendant had faced thousands of asbestos
claims over a period of decades, and new claimants continued to
come forward on a regular basis. The proposed class settlement
would have stopped this flood, providing compensation for the
claimants, closure for the company, and docket relief for the courts.
Because the Court determined that the litigation was not amenable to
class treatment, however, the company and claimants were instead
“consigned to the endless waiting that characterizes asbestos
169
bankruptcies.” This is not to say that the class settlement in Ortiz
should have been approved. My point is only that class treatment
would have saved time and money, a possibility that the current classaction debate largely neglects.
The aggregation of monetary claims large enough to proceed
individually, like those in Ortiz, can create efficiencies by reducing
the duplication of effort by judges and litigants in factually and legally
164. See id. at 503 (noting that the plaintiff filed his complaint on February 24, 1995);
Settlement and Release Agreement, Johnson v. California, No. 01-56436, 336 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir.
2003) (signed on December 12, 2005), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA0041-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/5PFP-FBW8].
165. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1998).
166. Id. at 816.
167. The case remained live after the parties agreed to settle it because under Rule 23(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a class action may not be settled without judicial approval,
and class members who object to a proposed settlement may appeal that approval. See, e.g.,
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 1 (2002) (holding that “non-named class members . . . who
have objected in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing have the
power to bring an appeal”).
168. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821; id. at 865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 866 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
169. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475,
1476 (2005); see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 108
(2007) (noting that much of the asbestos litigation after Ortiz and Amchem has proceeded
through asbestos-related reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Code, which disserve claimants
“in ways that make the qualms about the Amchem and Ortiz class settlements seem mild by
comparison”).
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similar cases. These potential efficiency gains exist regardless of
whether the aggregation occurs pursuant to the limited-fund class
action or the aggregated-damages class action—under either subtype,
discovery between the plaintiffs and the defendant will be bilateral
rather than multilateral, and common questions will be decided in
170
one proceeding rather than several. An analysis of the other
subtypes thus reveals that this aspect of the current debate has been
limited in its focus, not only to the aggregated-damages class action,
but to the negative-value aggregated-damages class action.
D. Other Topics of Debate
What is true of the foregoing topics is true of many others.
171
172
Discussions of litigant autonomy, agency costs, distortion of
173
174
substantive law, and institutional competence all have focused
almost exclusively on the aggregated-damages class action, resulting

170. To some degree, aggregation through the multi-district litigation statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (“the MDL statute”) also offers these potential efficiency gains. See, e.g., In re Bank of
N.Y. Mellon Corp. Foreign Exch. Transactions Litig., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2012)
(“Centralization [pursuant to the MDL statute,] will avoid duplicative discovery, eliminate the
risk of inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and
the judiciary.”). The MDL statute, however, allows consolidation only for pretrial matters; if not
settled, individual cases must be transferred back to their originating courts before trial.
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 26 (1998).
171. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 21, 24 (1996) (discussing concerns about litigant autonomy, and stating that “the class
action could be viewed as a device to fund the private attorney general and is able to play that
role because of the aggregation of the claims of a large number of persons who have similar or
identical claims, none of which—standing alone—would justify the suit.”). But see Samuel
Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2002) (noting that an individual’s effective degree of litigant
autonomy differs in situations governed by the injunctive civil-rights and limited-fund subtypes
as compared to the aggregated-damages subtype).
172. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 & n.5, 882–83
(1987) (discussing concerns about agency costs, and acknowledging the existence of Rules
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) in a footnote, but arguing that the description of the plaintiff’s lawyer as an
“independent entrepreneur” rather than “as an agent of the client” applies across the
substantive areas in which class actions are brought).
173. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 477–78 (discussing the distortion of substantive law, and stating that
“the theory of class actions is to take a weak signal and to amplify it by aggregating small claims
that would not otherwise be pursued individually, lowering the cost per individual suit”).
174. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and
Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 610 (2008) (discussing concerns about institutional
competence, and making only a brief reference to “the unusual settings” for class treatment
under subtypes other than the aggregated-damages class action).
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in a conceptually incomplete debate over the costs and benefits of the
175
class-action device. The class action’s opponents and proponents
have found common ground, but that common ground represents
only a portion of the territory covered by the class-action rule. Even
the most respected and accomplished attorneys and scholars have at
times limited their analysis in this manner. For example, consider
John Frank, a highly regarded scholar and advocate who served on
the rulemaking committee that drafted the modern class-action rule
176
in the early 1960s. Writing in the mid-1990s, Frank described the
rule’s origins and subtypes, then went on to discuss what he viewed as
177
the problems with the rule. The concerns that he identified in that
discussion related only to the aggregated-damages subtype. He
concluded that “the modern class action . . . ha[d] become a legal
178
mechanism out of control,” yet the analysis supported only the
conclusion that the aggregated-damages class action was a mechanism
out of control. If the luminaries who designed the modern rule can
fall prey to class-action myopia, it should come as no surprise that
others do as well.
III. THE UNDIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS OF THE
CLASS-ACTION DEBATE
The current concerns about the class-action device have been
debated within the limited context of the aggregated-damages class
179
action,
largely neglecting considerations related to the other
180
subtypes set forth in the rule. Even as the class-action debate has
narrowed in focus, however, its products have multiplied in scope and
effect. As this Part explains, over a period beginning roughly in the

175. I do not mean to suggest that these concerns have no salience under any of the other
subtypes; some do, to varying degrees. See infra Part V.A. But the criticisms have their origin in
the aggregated-damages class action, and their applicability to the other subtypes has gone
largely unexamined.
176. See generally John Q. Barrett, Teacher, Student, Ticket: John Frank, Leon
Higginbotham, and One Afternoon at the Supreme Court—Not A Trifling Thing, 20 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 311 (2002) (describing the success of Frank as a professor and advocate); Jonathan
L. Entin, In Memoriam: John P. Frank (November 10, 1917–September 7, 2002), 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 239 (2002) (chronicling the efforts of Frank that led to the widespread recognition
of his success). Frank dissented from the inclusion of the aggregated-damages subtype in the
revised rule. Frank, supra note 53, at 267.
177. Frank, supra note 53, at 264–70, 273–77.
178. Id. at 282.
179. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
180. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2).
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courts and lawmakers have imposed a series of
mid-1990s,
significant, across-the-board restrictions on class actions.
A. Interlocutory Appeals
The perceived connection between class certification and
settlement pressure has driven, in whole or in part, multiple efforts to
182
restrict the availability of the class-action device. In particular, a
1998 amendment to the class-action rule relied heavily on the concern
that class certification would lead to “in terrorem” settlements—that
is, compromises that reflect the defendant’s fear of a massive damages
183
award rather than the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. Other
motivations for the amendment included the fear that denial of class
treatment would effectively end the plaintiff’s case, and the need to
184
promote the development of appellate law about class certification.
185
The 1998 amendment added Rule 23(f), which makes class
certification decisions subject to interlocutory review at the discretion
186
of the appellate court. The Advisory Committee notes to the
amendment make its primary motivations clear:
[S]everal concerns justify expansion of present opportunities to
appeal. An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff
181. As Robert Klonoff has noted, “for many years following the adoption of the modern
federal class action rule (Rule 23) in 1966, most courts believed that the class action device was
a salutary tool for the administration of justice. This perception has changed to a significant
degree [in more recent times].” Klonoff, supra note 8, at 732; see also Robert G. Bone, The
Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 677 (2014) (“The liberal attitude
toward Rule 23, characteristic of the Rule’s early period, began to change in the 1990s.”).
182. Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23,
46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1110 (2013) (“[T]here is no doubt that concerns about improper
settlement leverage have had a major impact on class action decisions since the late 1990s.”).
For a discussion of the limited terms of the debate over settlement pressure, see supra Part II.A.
183. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 740–41; see also Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1275
(11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that fears that class certification would cause undue settlement
pressure “were the main reason behind the enactment of Rule 23(f)”).
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment.
185. The full text of Rule 23(f) reads:
A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying classaction certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with
the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay
proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so
orders.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
186. Id. An “interlocutory” appeal is one taken from an order or judgment that does not
end the case. See Interlocutory, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
“interlocutory” as “interim or temporary; not constituting a final resolution of the whole
controversy”).
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with a situation in which the only sure path to appellate review is by
proceeding to final judgment on the merits of an individual claim
that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of litigation. An
order granting certification, on the other hand, may force a
defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class
187
action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.

These concerns, involving settlement pressure and negative-value
monetary claims, have been debated almost exclusively within the
188
context of the aggregated-damages class action. Yet Rule 23(f)
opens up the possibility of interlocutory review for all class189
certification decisions, not just those involving monetary relief.
Although the rule allows either party to seek interlocutory
review, Robert Klonoff has demonstrated that “in terms of sheer
numbers, Rule 23(f) has served primarily as a device to protect
190
defendants.” Of all the appeals accepted from the provision’s
effective date through May 2012, more than two-thirds resulted from
a defendant’s request for review of a grant of class certification, and
defendants secured reversal in approximately 70 percent of those
191
appeals in which their request was granted. Conversely, “even when
plaintiffs convinced the appellate court to grant review, they lost in
192
the majority of cases.”
A subtype-specific analysis of these Rule 23(f) appeals reveals
that plaintiffs fared at least as badly in the appellate courts when
attempting to invoke the traditional subtypes as when attempting to

187. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment.
188. The other concern referenced in this excerpt, regarding the potential lack of economic
viability for an individual claim, represents a version of the “death knell” thesis. This recognizes
that a plaintiff with an individually small damages claim may abandon the litigation if the court
denies certification, because in the absence of aggregation, the potential recovery (and
contingency fee) will not be worth the candle. See generally Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463 (1978) (analyzing the death knell thesis). As with concerns about settlement pressure,
this analysis tends to assume that all class-action subtypes will increase the potential recovery
for the class (and thus the potential contingency fee). For an explanation of why this assumption
fails, see supra Part II.A.
189. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (creating no distinction among class-action subtypes or relief
sought).
190. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 741; see also Malveaux, supra note 38, at 505 (“Even when
employees and other civil rights litigants are successful at class certification, their success runs
the risk of being short lived because of increased access to appellate review.”).
191. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 741. This high reversal rate results in part from the changes
discussed infra in Parts III.B–E, which constrain the availability of the class-action device by
“impos[ing] new hurdles that make certification even more challenging for plaintiffs.” Id.
192. Id.
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rely on the aggregated-damages subtype. For example, considering
only those appeals involving the injunctive civil-rights subtype,
defendants won reversal in more than three-quarters of cases in which
the district court granted certification, while plaintiffs won reversal in
only one-third of cases in which the district court denied
194
certification. Accordingly, the effect of the rule has been to increase
the difficulty of obtaining class-wide adjudication of a claim,
regardless of subtype.
Moreover, plaintiffs must expend time and resources even on
those appeals in which they ultimately succeed, further increasing the
transaction costs associated with class treatment. The impact of these
increased transaction costs should not be minimized, especially in the
context of litigation seeking injunctive or declaratory relief for civilrights violations. Because this type of litigation usually consumes
rather than generates resources on the plaintiffs’ side, even when the
195
litigation succeeds in obtaining relief, even the strongest claims are
unlikely to get to court without the involvement of nonprofit
196
organizations, pro bono attorneys, or other charitable efforts.
Higher transaction costs further suppress the availability of
representation for these types of class-action plaintiffs, and they limit
the resources that organizations can commit to other activities when
they do represent such plaintiffs on a class basis.

193. The data in this paragraph are based on my review of the 209 appeals decided pursuant
to Rule 23(f) from its effective date through May 31, 2012, listed in Klonoff, supra note 8, at
app. A. The appeals broke down as follows: 4.31 percent (nine appeals) involved the logicalindivisibility subtype; 2.39 percent (five appeals) involved the limited-fund subtype; 29.19
percent (sixty-one appeals) involved the injunctive civil-rights subtype; and 85.17 percent (178
appeals) involved the aggregated-damages subtype. Id. These percentages do not add up to 100
because of cases in which plaintiffs sought certification under more than one subtype.
194. As noted previously, only 9 of the 209 appeals involved the logical-indivisibility
subtype, and only 5 involved the limited-fund subtype. See supra note 193. Considering only
those two subtypes, defendants won reversal in two-thirds and 100 percent, respectively, of the
cases in which the district court granted certification, while plaintiffs won reversal in none of the
cases in which the district court denied certification. Id.
195. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
196. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money Got to Do with It?: Public Interest Lawyering
and Profit, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 482–88 (2014) (explaining that “[c]ivil litigation is often an
expensive proposition” requiring “ample financial resources”).
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B. Evidentiary Burdens
The class-action rule does not state the evidentiary burden
197
required of plaintiffs seeking class treatment. Before 2000, many
plaintiffs obtained certification on the basis of minimal evidence, or
even mere allegations, that the proposed class met the requirements
198
of Rule 23. In the early 2000s, however, courts began to increase the
standard of proof required for class certification, regardless of
199
subtype.
The heightened standards of proof flow largely from concerns
200
about settlement pressure.
Consider, for example, the Third
Circuit’s influential decision in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
201
Litigation. The court held that “[i]n deciding whether to certify a
class under [Rule] 23, the district court must make whatever factual
and legal inquiries are necessary and must consider all relevant
202
evidence and arguments presented by the parties.” As articulated
by the court, this standard requires judicial findings in support of each
Rule 23 element, including factual determinations based on a
203
preponderance of the evidence. The court decided that a more
lenient standard would not suffice, largely because it viewed the
certification decision as crucially important to both parties:
Careful application of Rule 23 accords with the pivotal status of
class certification in large-scale litigation, because “denying or
granting class certification is often the defining moment in class
actions (for it may sound the ‘death knell’ of the litigation on the

197. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Bone, supra note 182, at 1112.
198. Bone, supra note 182, at 1111–12.
199. Id. In 2006 and 2008, the Second and Third Circuits issued influential opinions
addressing the evidentiary showing required for class certification. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24
(2d Cir. 2006). The two decisions “are examples of a trend in the circuits toward stricter
evidentiary burdens.” RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, ROBERT G. BONE, ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE
BURCH, CHARLES SILVER & PATRICK WOOLLEY, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER
AGGREGATE LITIGATION 280 (2d ed. 2013). Both were influenced by the Seventh Circuit’s
prior decision in Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
200. Bone, supra note 182, at 1110. For a discussion of the concerns that courts and
commentators have raised about improper settlement pressure resulting from class certification,
see supra Part II.A.
201. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 305.
202. Id. at 307.
203. Id.
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part of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to settle
204
nonmeritorious claims on the part of defendants).”

Like other cases imposing strict evidentiary standards, this reasoning
relies on the products of a debate limited to the context of the
205
aggregated-damages class action. Yet its holding, and others like it,
embrace all of the class-action subtypes in an undifferentiated
206
manner.
Heightened evidentiary burdens increase the transaction costs
associated with class treatment, as they require plaintiffs to introduce
evidence supporting certification at an early stage in the
207
208
proceedings, often without the benefits of full discovery. As to
cases brought under subtypes other than the aggregated-damages
class action, courts have not articulated a justification for those
increased costs, which have a negative impact on the availability of
the traditional subtypes.

204. Id. at 310 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d
154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001)).
205. For a discussion on the scope of disputes over settlement pressure, see supra Part II.A
(discussing the scope of disputes over settlement pressure); supra note 188 (discussing the scope
of the “death knell” thesis).
206. See, e.g., Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316 (referring to “the requirements of Rule
23” rather than the requirements of a particular subtype); see also Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467,
484–85 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying the predominance standard to both the aggregated-damages
and the injunctive civil-rights subtypes). The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart did not
clarify the applicable evidentiary standard to the extent that some had hoped. See, e.g., Bone,
supra note 134, at 116 (arguing that the Court should adopt a more principled standard, possibly
differentiated by subtype, in its Wal-Mart decision). It did, however, make clear that class-action
plaintiffs must present evidence, not just allegations, to demonstrate their compliance with Rule
23. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
207. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (requiring a court to decide the certification issue at
“an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative”).
208. In theory, courts should permit sufficient precertification discovery to allow the
plaintiff an opportunity to make the required showing; but in practice, some impose circular
constraints or strict limits on precertification discovery. See, e.g., Edwards v. First Am. Corp.,
385 Fed. App’x 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing the district court’s denial of precertification
discovery, and permitting the plaintiff to bring a new motion for class certification after
completion of that discovery); Tracy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 303, 305 (D.
Colo. 1998) (“Before classwide discovery is allowed, plaintiffs must demonstrate that ‘there is
some factual basis for plaintiffs’ claims of classwide discrimination.’” (quoting Severtson v.
Phillips Beverage Co., 137 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D. Minn. 1991))); see also 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra
note 14, § 7:17 (“Courts . . . struggle to balance the fact that the certification decision overlaps
with the merits with the idea that certification ought to be resolved before the merits, perhaps
before full-on merits discovery.”); Malveaux, supra note 38, at 498 (“[T]he trajectory for [precertification] discovery has been increasingly constrictive . . . . [E]mployers are now seeking to
dismiss class claims on the face of the complaint pre-discovery, and some are prevailing.”).
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C. Enumerated Ascertainability
209

In 2003, five years after the adoption of Rule 23(f), another
amendment to the class-action rule codified the requirement that
“[a]n order that certifies a class action must define the class and the
210
class claims, issues, or defenses.” This class-definition requirement
had appeared in case law before the 2003 amendment, but at that
point, few courts had denied certification on the basis of an
211
inadequate definition. Courts have increasingly done so in the years
following the amendment, often without giving plaintiffs an
opportunity to amend the class definition to address the court’s
212
concerns.
The Manual for Complex Litigation, published by the Federal
Judicial Center for the benefit of federal trial judges, provides “some
general guidance” as to the characteristics of an adequate class
213
definition. It states that “[t]he definition must be precise, objective,
and presently ascertainable,” but with regard to ascertainability, it
notes that “Rule 23(b)(3) actions require a class definition that will
permit identification of individual class members, while Rule 23(b)(1)
214
or (b)(2) actions may not.” The latter part of this articulation of the
ascertainability standard accords with the Advisory Committee’s
statement, in its note to the 1966 revisions, that the injunctive civilrights subtype was intended to reach situations “where a party is
charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one
215
whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.”

209. See supra Part II.A.
210. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
211. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 763–64.
212. Id. at 761–68. In addition to the possibility of giving plaintiffs the opportunity to change
their class definition, courts have discretion to change the definition themselves, and many
continue to do so rather than deny certification altogether. See generally Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1897, 1918–26 (2014) (examining
cases in which courts “alter[ed] the definition or scope of a plaintiff’s proposed class” instead of
denying certification).
213. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 761 (noting that Rule 23 “does not elaborate on what
constitutes an adequate class definition”).
214. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.222 (4th ed. 2004).
215. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (emphasis added).
For an argument that this articulation is incorrect even as to the aggregated-damages subtype,
see Geoffrey C. Shaw, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2367 (2015); see also infra
note 219 (showing that the language of Rule 23 recognizes that not all individuals in a class will
be ascertainable).
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As the Manual and the Advisory Committee note suggest, the
function of the class definition varies depending on the particular
subtype involved. In an aggregated-damages class action, for
216
example, class members are entitled to notice of the action, an
217
opportunity to opt out, and (usually) a personalized monetary
218
award if the action succeeds. Unless the class definition enables the
court and litigants to create an enumerated list of the members of the
class, providing notice and distributing monetary awards might prove
219
difficult. In contrast, an injunctive civil-rights class action does not
220
require notice to class members or the distribution of individualized
221
monetary relief. Instead of individual compensation, such an action
focuses on changing the defendant’s conduct, which can be done
222
without identifying each member of the class by name. Accordingly,
“it is not clear that the implied requirement of definiteness [another

216. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court
must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”).
217. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (“The notice must clearly and concisely state . . . that the
court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion.”).
218. But see Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the
Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV.
617, 620 (2010) (discussing “fluid recovery” and “cy pres” remedies, which “refer to efforts to
provide the ‘next best’ form of relief in cases where it is impractical or impossible to directly
compensate the injured class members”).
219. The class-action rule itself, however, appears to contemplate that some members of an
aggregated-damages class will not be individually identifiable. Specifically, the notice provision
states that “[f]or any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members
the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (emphasis
added). A requirement of enumerated ascertainability would render that final phrase
superfluous. See Shaw, supra note 215, at 2367 (noting the tension between this language and
the ascertainability requirement).
220. The class-action rule gives courts discretion as to whether notice must be provided in a
particular case involving one of the traditional subtypes. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (“For any
class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the
class.” (emphasis added)).
221. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that a class action certified under the
injunctive civil-rights subtype cannot include claims for individualized monetary relief. WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–61 (2011).
222. Under any subtype, the class definition facilitates class-wide preclusion, but the
features of the class definition that are necessary to achieve that preclusion vary by subtype as
well. In an injunctive civil-rights class action, for example, the definition need only describe the
class in terms that will enable a later court to tell whether the plaintiff standing before it
belonged to that class (and thus is now precluded from bringing his or her claim). Enabling this
reverse-engineering does not require individual enumeration of class members at the time of the
original class certification or judgment.
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term for ascertainability] should apply to Rule 23(b)(2) class actions
223
at all.”
Not all courts impose a strict “definiteness” or “ascertainability”
requirement for class certification, and of those that do, some
recognize that enumerated ascertainability (that is, the ability to
identify each class member by name at the time of the class
certification or judgment) should not be required under all
224
subtypes. Recently, however, some courts have begun to apply a
225
more exacting version of the ascertainability standard, even in cases
226
involving the injunctive civil-rights subtype. This approach can have
the illogical result that an inability to enumerate each person affected
by a defendant’s policy or practice prevents the court from
determining whether to enjoin the defendant from engaging in that
227
policy or practice. Class-action law may thus be moving toward
another undifferentiated restriction on the availability of class
223. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 14, § 3:7.
224. Id.; see, e.g., Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding that
ascertainability is a requirement for certification of an aggregated-damages class action but not
an injunctive civil-rights class action). The subtype-differentiated nature of the inquiry into the
adequacy of the class definition has long been recognized:
This case brings into sharp focus the relationship between class actions under Rule
23(b)(2), and class actions under Rule 23(b)(3). The provisions of Rule 23(b)(2) are
designed to cover cases in which the primary concern is the grant of injunctive or
declaratory relief. In such cases, there is no requirement that notice be given to all of
the class members, and there is no opportunity for putative class members to “opt
out.” Moreover, the precise definition of the class is relatively unimportant. If relief is
granted to the plaintiff class, the defendants are legally obligated to comply, and it is
usually unnecessary to define with precision the persons entitled to enforce
compliance, since presumably at least the representative plaintiffs would be available
to seek, and interested in obtaining, follow-up relief if necessary.
In a (b)(3) action, on the other hand, because of the notice and “opt out” features,
greater precision in class definition is required. Moreover, most such actions involve
claims for damages, and it is usually necessary, at some point, to identify individual
members of the class.
Rice v. City of Phila., 66 F.R.D. 17, 19 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
225. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 762 (“In recent years . . . a significant number of courts have
utilized the requirement of an adequate class definition to deny class certification. In the last
five years alone, dozens of cases have denied class certification because of a flawed definition
(either solely on that ground or as one of alternative grounds).”); see also id.at 762 n.188
(identifying dozens of cases in which courts have denied class certification by finding an
inadequate class definition).
226. Id. at 764–65 (discussing Romberio v. UnumProvident Corp., 385 Fed. App’x 423 (6th
Cir. 2009), involving the injunctive civil-rights subtype, and noting that “[t]he approach in
Romberio is especially troublesome because courts are supposed to be less exacting in assessing
class definitions in (b)(2) cases than in (b)(3) cases”); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing Jamie
S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012), involving the injunctive civil-rights
subtype).
227. For a detailed example of this effect, see infra Part IV.A.
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treatment, one that not only increases the transaction costs associated
with class certification, but that also can defeat certification
altogether.
D. Class Waivers
Beginning in 2010, in a series of decisions interpreting the
Federal Arbitration Act, the U.S. Supreme Court has dramatically
expanded defendants’ ability to avoid class treatment through the use
228
of contractual waivers. Taken together, these cases establish that a
preexisting contract between the plaintiff and defendant can preclude
class treatment, both in federal court and within the arbitral forum, if
it contains an arbitration clause that either prohibits the aggregation
229
230
of claims or is silent on the issue. In the view of some scholars,
“[a]ll of the doctrinal developments of recent years circumscribing the
reach of class actions pale in import” next to these decisions, which
permit companies to “opt out of potential liability by incorporating
class action waiver language in their standard form contracts with
231
consumers (or employees or others).”
The rationales for these class-waiver holdings reflect the limited
scope of the class-action debate. The Court has asserted that class
proceedings take too long and cost too much to be used in
232
arbitration, reflecting the limited terms of disputes over expense
233
and delay. The Court has also stated that “class arbitration greatly
increases risks to defendants,” and that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited
234
to the higher stakes of class litigation,” reflecting the limited terms
235
of disputes over settlement pressure. Moreover, in the most recent
of these cases, the Court provided a justification for precluding the
creation of economically viable claims under the aggregated-damages

228. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–51 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774 (2010).
229. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752–53.
230. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1771. If the arbitrator finds that the parties’ contract provides
for class arbitration, however, a court will not reverse that finding. Oxford Health Plans LLC v.
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2070 (2013).
231. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012).
232. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
233. See supra Part II.C.
234. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752
235. See supra Part II.A.
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236

subtype. Yet the Court has failed to acknowledge or justify the
simultaneous constriction of the other subtypes, even as it has
announced these new interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act
that apply across the board in permitting defendants to contract their
237
way out of class treatment.
The impact of the Court’s recent class-waiver decisions on the
injunctive civil-rights class action is especially troubling. Consider, for
example, employment-discrimination class actions seeking injunctive
relief against an employer’s generally applicable policy or practice.
Such actions could ultimately disappear from the courts altogether,
because “[a]t the time of hiring—or, indeed, at any time thereafter—
businesses can (and often do) ask their employees to sign contractual
agreements, including clauses to arbitrate any dispute that might
238
arise.” It is reasonable to think that most—if not all—businesses will
eventually choose to adopt employment contracts with nonclass
arbitration clauses, and thereby prevent employment-related class
239
actions from being brought against them.
Courts and lawmakers have long recognized that cases seeking
broad injunctive relief can offer public as well as private benefits.
Indeed, Congress has enacted a range of fee-shifting statutes to
encourage litigants to secure those public benefits, and the Supreme
Court has recognized that when a fee-shifting plaintiff “obtains an
injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a ‘private
attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
240
highest priority.” Permitting defendants to avoid class actions
seeking this type of injunctive relief limits the efficacy of the would236. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013).
237. Previously, for example, California law did not allow a defendant to compel arbitration
of certain claims seeking broad injunctions that would benefit the public. See Cruz v. PacifiCare
Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1165 (Cal. 2003); Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988
P.2d 67, 73–74 (Cal. 1999). In light of Concepcion and the other arbitration cases discussed
above, however, those claims are now subject to mandatory arbitration. See Ferguson v.
Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the abrogation of
Broughton and Cruz); Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198, 214–15
(Cal. App. 2012), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 14, 2012).
238. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 176 (2015).
239. Id.
240. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968). This is not to say that a
remedial system offering only injunctive relief is without problems. See generally Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA
Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2006) (arguing that a remedial system offering only injunctive
relief reduces the amount of cases brought and encourages conduct that defendants view as
abusive).
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be private attorney general by consigning him to the arbitral forum—
or, potentially, dissuading him from seeking enforcement at all.
E. Heightened Commonality
In its 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the U.S.
Supreme Court introduced yet another undifferentiated restriction on
the availability of class treatment. The decision imposed a much
stricter version of the commonality requirement—one of the four
241
prerequisites that all class actions must satisfy —than courts had
242
previously applied. Notwithstanding the language of the rule, which
requires only that there be “questions of law or fact common to the
243
class,” the Court rejected the proposition that the identification of
244
common questions should suffice to establish commonality. Instead,
the Court held that all class members must “have suffered the same
245
injury,”
that “[t]heir claims must depend upon a common
contention” that is “central to the validity of each one of the claims,”
and that resolution of the common contention must resolve a central
246
issue “in one stroke.” This inquiry requires a focus on dissimilarities
within the proposed class, the Court explained, because those
dissimilarities “have the potential to impede the generation of
common answers” to the common questions that the class purports to
247
present.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg objected that the Court had
imported into the commonality requirement, which applies to all
class-action subtypes, the more stringent “predominance” and
“superiority” standards that apply only to the aggregated-damages
248
class action. Specifically, Justice Ginsburg argued that

241. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
242. A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to
Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 463 (2013).
243. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
244. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
245. Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)).
246. Id.; see also Spencer, supra note 242, at 464 (referring to these three requirements as
“the same injury, centrality, and efficiency requirements”).
247. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
248. Id. at 2565–66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (allowing
certification of an aggregated-damages class action only if “the court finds that the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members [predominance], and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy [superiority]”).
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[t]he Court’s emphasis on differences between class members
mimics the Rule 23(b)(3) inquiry into whether common questions
“predominate” over individual issues. And by asking whether the
individual differences “impede” common adjudication, the Court
duplicates 23(b)(3)’s question whether “a class action is superior” to
other modes of adjudication. . . . If courts must conduct a
“dissimilarities” analysis at the Rule 23(a)(2) [commonality] stage,
249
no mission remains for Rule 23(b)(3).

The dissent noted that the Court’s directive to focus on dissimilarities
as part of the commonality analysis was “far reaching” because of its
effects on subtypes other than the aggregated-damages class action:
“Individual differences should not bar a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule
250
23(b)(2) class, so long as the Rule 23(a) threshold is met.”
251
The Wal-Mart commonality holding appears to arise from a
somewhat different source than the other products of myopia
discussed above. The Court did not explicitly articulate the concerns
that motivated its ratcheting-up of the commonality requirement,
creating ambiguity as to whether it analyzed those concerns only
252
within the limited context of the aggregated-damages subtype.
Moreover, another part of the opinion explicitly discussed (and
strengthened) the distinctions between the traditional subtypes and
the aggregated-damages class action, making clear that the Court had
253
the existence of those subtypes firmly in mind.

249. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
250. Id. The majority responded, “We consider dissimilarities not in order to determine (as
Rule 23(b)(3) [the aggregated-damages subtype] requires) whether common questions
predominate, but in order to determine (as Rule 23(a)(2) [the commonality prerequisite]
requires) whether there is even a single common question.” Id. at 2556 (majority opinion)
(alterations omitted) (emphases omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
251. For an argument that “the Court’s holding does not speak primarily to the content of
Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement,” but instead “sounds in the liability policies of Title
VII,” see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1027, 1038 (2013).
252. Cf. Bone, supra note 181, at 699 (“The Court’s rationale for this stricter rule [i.e. the
commonality holding in Wal-Mart] is not terribly clear.”).
253. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–61 (holding that claims for individualized monetary relief
cannot be brought pursuant to the injunctive civil-rights subtype). As Elizabeth Porter has
noted, these two portions of the Wal-Mart opinion demonstrate dramatic differences in tone and
interpretive approach, to the point that they almost seem like they could have been written by
different justices. See Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 128
(2015).
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The features of the opinion described in the previous paragraph
suggest that the Court may not have fallen prey to the same form of
myopia that led to the other undifferentiated changes discussed in this
Part. The across-the-board nature of those changes resulted from
what might be termed a “concern-based” form of myopia, in which
concerns about the aggregated-damages class action are permitted to
spill over onto and restrict the availability of the other subtypes. That
is, it does not appear that the Court imposed its across-the-board
change in the commonality requirement based on a specific concern
that applies only in the limited context of the aggregated-damages
class action.
Although the Wal-Mart commonality holding does not appear to
represent a concern-based form of myopia, it does appear to
represent a claim-based form of myopia, in which undue attention to
the monetary relief sought by the class renders invisible the injunctive
or declaratory relief being sought simultaneously. The plaintiffs’
stated purpose in the Wal-Mart litigation was to obtain a class-wide
injunction restructuring the defendant’s employment practices, so as
to counteract the gender bias that (according to plaintiffs) pervaded
the company’s operations. The part of the opinion addressing
commonality ignored that stated purpose entirely. Instead, consistent
with a myopic focus on aggregated-damages claims, the Court focused
exclusively on the monetary relief the plaintiffs sought for individual
class members: it identified the “crucial question” in the litigation as
254
“why was I disfavored” (that is, are individual class members
entitled to monetary relief) rather than “are the defendant’s
255
company-wide employment practices unlawful” (that is, is a classwide injunction warranted).
The Court reached its conclusion about the “crucial question” in
256
the case after citing to Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
for the proposition that “in resolving an individual’s Title VII claim,
the crux of the inquiry is ‘the reason for a particular employment
257
decision.’” This choice of authority is odd, to say the least. Cooper
emphasized the “manifest” differences between a Title VII class

254. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552.
255. See id. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court gives no credence to the key
dispute common to the class: whether Wal-Mart’s discretionary pay and promotion policies are
discriminatory.”).
256. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876 (1984).
257. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552.
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action challenging a general pattern and practice of discrimination
258
(like Wal-Mart) and a Title VII claim involving an individual. The
Cooper Court stated that “[t]he inquiry regarding an individual’s
claim is the reason for a particular employment decision, while at the
liability stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be
on individual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory
259
decisionmaking.” The Wal-Mart Court’s reasoning and choice of
authority makes sense only if one views the case narrowly (indeed,
myopically) as a collection of individual damages claims, overlooking
that the plaintiffs requested class-wide injunctive relief.
To be clear, the problem with the across-the-board reach of the
Wal-Mart commonality holding is not that commonality should mean
something different for each subtype. Rather, the problem is that,
because different subtypes involve different types of claims and
different forms of relief, there are some functions that the
commonality requirement—which applies to all of the subtypes,
260
unlike, for example, the predominance requirement —should not
261
overextending
perform. As with enumerated ascertainability,
commonality can prevent the class-wide adjudication of claims,
thereby preventing the traditional subtypes from performing their
intended functions.
The decision in Wal-Mart is widely recognized as a sea change in
class-action law, though as the foregoing discussion demonstrates,
class-action plaintiffs did not find themselves in friendly seas even
before that opinion issued. Over the past several years, an
“unambitious and unflattering vision of class actions . . . has become
262
the regnant view among legislative and judicial policymakers.” That
vision has caused significant changes to the law governing all classaction subtypes, but it arises from a debate focused almost entirely on
the aggregated-damages class action.

258. Cooper, 467 U.S. at 876.
259. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
260. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
261. See supra Part III.C.
262. Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 698. Though not discussed in the text, the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 both responded and contributed to this negative view of class actions; the
statute expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions, but its impact reaches beyond the
doctrinal changes it introduced. See id.; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1530 (2008)
(“[S]ome of CAFA’s supporters were not seeking different class action law so much as they
were seeking different attitudes towards class certification.”).
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IV. CASE STUDIES OF THE HARM TO COURTS AND LITIGANTS
Concerns arising from the limited context of the aggregated263
damages class action have constrained the availability of the class264
action device as a whole, including the logical-indivisibility, limited265
266
fund,
and injunctive civil-rights
subtypes. This constriction
implicates a deep historical irony. The least controversial class
forms—the ones that had already achieved widespread acceptance as
situations demanding class treatment at the time of the 1966
revisions—have been eclipsed by the form that the designers of the
267
modern framework were not even sure whether to include. Worries
268
about the “‘adventuresome’ innovation”
represented by the
aggregated-damages class action have thereby lessened the
availability of the subtypes that have long been viewed as
269
institutionally beneficial. This Part aims to illustrate the harms
caused by that lessened availability through case studies of recent
actions in which the plaintiffs relied on the injunctive civil-rights class
action, or in which they could have done so, but chose not to.
A. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools
For some civil-rights claims, the recent constraints on class
treatment have effectively prevented any adjudication of the factual
and legal issues presented, whether in favor of the plaintiffs or the
270
defendants. For example, consider Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public
271
Schools, a case decided by the Seventh Circuit in 2012. In Jamie S.,
the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a
putative class of special-education students, alleging that defendants
Milwaukee Public Schools and Wisconsin Department of Instruction

263. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
264. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
265. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
266. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
267. See supra Part I.
268. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (citation omitted).
269. See supra Part III (discussing across-the-board restrictions on the class-action device
imposed in response to concerns largely rooted in the aggregated-damages subtype).
270. Cf. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 680 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that in the absence of
class treatment, Eighth Amendment violations allegedly caused by the under-resourcing of a
prison system would likely go unaddressed); Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir.
2014) (en banc) (holding that, in a nonclass damages suit against prison officials, underresourcing can excuse what would otherwise constitute an Eighth Amendment violation).
271. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012).
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had violated their rights under the Individuals with Disabilities
272
Specifically, the IDEA requires
Education Act (IDEA).
participating states to implement a process known as “child find,”
under which all children with disabilities who are “residing in the
State . . . and who are in need of special education and related
273
services, are identified, located, and evaluated.” The Jamie S.
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to satisfy the childfind requirements, resulting in students with disabilities being denied
274
or delayed access to special-education services.
The district court granted certification, under the injunctive civilrights subtype, for a class defined as follows:
Those students eligible for special education services from the
Milwaukee Public School System who are, have been or will be
either denied or delayed entry or participation in the processes
which result in a properly constituted meeting between the IEP
275
team and the parents or guardians of the student.

The court subsequently found the defendants liable for violating the
276
277
child-find requirements. It ordered the defendant school district to
implement a complex remedial scheme, under which the parents or
guardians of potential class members would receive notice and an
opportunity for an evaluation of their child’s special-education
278
needs.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the remedial order and
decertified the class, holding that the proposed class failed on grounds
279
280
281
of ascertainability,
commonality,
and indivisibility.
As to

272. Id. at 484–86. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from Disability Rights
Wisconsin, a nonprofit advocacy group. Id. at 484.
273. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2012).
274. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 485. The plaintiffs had initially pleaded a broader set of
allegations, but by the time of the appellate court’s decision, the scope of the case had been
narrowed. Id.
275. Id. at 487–88. An IEP, or Individualized Education Plan, outlines the specific
educational services to which a child is statutorily entitled. Those services are identified and
memorialized at a meeting attended by the members of the child’s “IEP team,” including his or
her parent or guardian. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4)–(5), 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012)).
276. Id. at 488.
277. The defendant state agency had settled with the plaintiffs after the liability phase
ended. Id.
278. Id. at 489.
279. Id. at 485. Ascertainability, a term that does not appear in the class-action rule, refers
to a court’s ability to identify the members of the class. For a discussion of the impact of myopia
on the ascertainability requirement, see supra Part III.C.
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ascertainability, the court held that “this class lacks the definiteness
required for class certification; there is no way to know or readily
282
ascertain who is a member of the class.” It then held commonality
to be lacking because “resolving any individual class member’s claim
for relief under the IDEA requires an inherently particularized
283
inquiry into the circumstances of the child’s case.” Finally, it held
that the class did not seek an appropriately class-wide remedy
because “as a substantive matter the relief sought would merely
initiate a process through which highly individualized determinations
of liability and remedy are made; this kind of relief would be class284
wide in name only.”
It is profoundly unlikely that any of the reasons articulated in
Jamie S. would have prevented certification under the injunctive civilrights class action as it was understood in 1966. Consider a
paradigmatic desegregation case during the time of pupil-assignment
laws, which allowed school boards to conduct an individualized,
multiple-factor assessment of each student’s appropriate school
285
placement. Even though the process as a whole resulted in
segregated schools, there was no way to know what the outcome of
the individualized inquiry for any particular African American
student would have been if the process had been conducted fairly.
Under the logic of Jamie S., the class of students denied equal
treatment would thus be unascertainable on the basis that “there is no
286
way to know or readily ascertain who is a member of the class.”
Similarly, because resolving any particular class member’s claim for

280. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 485–86. Commonality refers to the requirement, set forth in Rule
23(a)(2), that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
For a discussion of the impact of myopia on the commonality requirement, see supra Part III.E.
281. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 485–86. Indivisibility, another term that does not appear in the
class-action rule, has resisted a straightforward definition. See infra Part V.C. In Wal-Mart, the
Court explained indivisibility as “the notion that the conduct [challenged by the class] is such
that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of
them.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (quoting Nagareda, supra
note 247, at 132).
282. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 495. The Seventh Circuit recently declined to adopt an
ascertainability standard for aggregated-damages class actions as strict as the one that other
courts have applied. See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015). In that
opinion, however, the Seventh Circuit referred to Jamie S. as an example of an acceptably
“weak” ascertainability requirement applicable to all subtypes. Id. at 659.
283. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 498.
284. Id. at 499.
285. See supra Part I.A.3.
286. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 495.
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admission to the all-white school would “require[] an inherently
287
particularized inquiry into the circumstances of the child’s case,” the
class would also lack commonality. Finally, because reassigning
students on a nonsegregated basis would “merely initiate a process
through which highly individualized determinations of liability and
288
remedy are made,” the remedy would not be deemed appropriate
under Rule 23(b)(2). Yet this was precisely the type of case for which
289
the injunctive civil-rights class action was designed.
The Jamie S. opinion contains some suggestions that the court’s
real objection was not to the appropriateness of class treatment, but
to the cost and intrusiveness of the proposed remedy. The court noted
that the district court’s order “required [the defendant] to create a
massive identification and evaluation system consuming significant
290
educational resources and costing millions of dollars.” It also
dismissed a precedent upon which the plaintiffs had relied as “a relic
of a time when the federal judiciary thought that structural
291
injunctions taking control of executive functions were sensible.”
The increasing restrictions on class treatment enable courts to
transform objections like these into barriers to certification.
If the burdensomeness of the remedy is the problem, however,
292
class certification is not the appropriate point at which to address it.
Indeed, the certification stage often will not even be an effective point

287. Id. at 498.
288. Id. at 499.
289. This is not to say that these types of cases should automatically be certified without
procedural protections, such as class-wide notice and subclassing, that the authors of the 1966
revisions would have deemed unnecessary. Indeed, insights gained in the years since the
adoption of the modern class-action rule suggest a need for more thorough analysis of intraclass
conflicts in injunctive civil-rights class actions than those authors likely had in mind. See, e.g.,
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976). Denying certification altogether,
however, cannot generally offer an effective response to such conflicts, as it “would often
introduce all the inefficiencies attending individual suits, without necessarily restricting the
scope of the ultimate decree.” Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1183, 1195 (1982); see also infra Part IV.A (arguing that, before limiting class treatment in
response to a concern about the class-action device, courts and policymakers should determine
whether the denial of class treatment will effectively address that concern).
290. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 491.
291. Id. at 496 (quoting Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2008)).
292. Cf. Marcus, Public Interest, supra note 38, at 21 (noting that “no one has developed . . .
to any extent” the idea that “class action procedure is the right lever to pull” to rein in structural
reform litigation); Wolff, supra note 251, at 1042 (arguing, in the context of statutory-damages
actions, that “Rule 23 does not set policy on the propriety of aggregate remedies as a means of
accomplishing regulatory goals”).
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at which to address that problem, as many courts will issue structural
injunctions or other potentially burdensome remedies in the absence
293
of class treatment. Moreover, denying class certification leaves
defendants without the benefit of class-wide preclusion. They remain
subject to suit on the identical issue, and there is no preclusive barrier
294
to a subsequent suit proceeding in class form. At the same time, the
absence of class treatment can leave plaintiffs without a meaningful
remedy, no matter how egregious or widespread the violation. For
example, those affected may be unaware that their rights have been
violated, or they may lack the resources to bring individual lawsuits in
295
numbers sufficient to justify systemic relief. It would be far better to
resolve the factual and legal issues as to the class as a whole—whether
in favor of the plaintiffs or the defendants—and if the plaintiffs
prevailed, to apply remedial principles to determine the appropriate
296
scope of the remedy.

293. To the contrary, courts sometimes deny a plaintiff’s request for class certification on
the ground that the court will issue as broad a remedy to the individual plaintiff as it would to a
plaintiff class, making class treatment unnecessary. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 7AA FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785.2 (3d ed.
2005 & Supp. 2015). For criticism of this “necessity” doctrine, see Carroll, supra note 28, at
2077–78.
294. This is because, as the Supreme Court recently made clear, “[n]either a proposed class
action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties.” Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368,
2380 (2011). The Court acknowledged that “the rule against nonparty preclusion . . . perforce
leads to relitigation of many issues, as plaintiff after plaintiff after plaintiff (none precluded by
the last judgment because none a party to the last suit) tries his hand at establishing some legal
principle or obtaining some grant of relief.” Id. at 2381.
295. Writing separately in Jamie S., Judge Rovner expressed concerns along these lines. See
Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 505 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She argued that:
[The absence of class treatment] would surely mean that many such students would
remain unidentified and denied their right to free appropriate public education (if
only because they would be unaware of their rights) and likely would mean that the
systemic violation underlying their claims to relief would persist, as any individual
proceedings would result in individual rather than structural relief.
Id. Similarly, in a case involving unlawful strip searches, the Second Circuit determined that
[a]bsent class certification and its attendant class-wide notice procedures, most of
these individuals—who potentially number in the thousands—likely never will know
that defendants violated their clearly established constitutional rights, and thus never
will be able to vindicate those rights. As a practical matter, then, without use of the
class action mechanism, individuals harmed by defendants’ policy and practice may
lack an effective remedy altogether.
In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 229 (2d Cir. 2006).
296. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“[I]njunctive relief should be
no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs.”).
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B. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry
The recent restrictions on class treatment, coupled with the
instability of the doctrine, have led to significant and unproductive
delays in the resolution of class actions brought under the traditional
297
subtypes. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, a case decided by the
Fifth Circuit in 2012, provides an example of this phenomenon. The
plaintiffs in M.D. alleged that understaffing and general underresourcing of the Texas foster-care system exposed the state’s 12,000
foster children to an unreasonable risk of harm, in violation of the
298
children’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs filed their
complaint in March 2011, and they moved for class certification less
than a week later; the district court granted certification less than two
299
months after that, and soon set a trial date for February 2013. The
case appeared to be moving relatively expeditiously toward a merits
resolution.
An interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 23(f), however, sent
300
the case back to the certification stage. In its March 2012 decision in
that appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s
intervening decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes required it to
301
vacate the district court’s class certification order. First, the Fifth
Circuit held that the lower court had failed to conduct the “rigorous
302
analysis” that Wal-Mart required as to commonality. Next, the
appellate court held that the proposed class failed to meet the
requirements of the injunctive civil-rights subtype, because the
plaintiffs had not shown that a single injunction could provide relief
303
to the entire class. The court noted that if the plaintiffs attempted to

297. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2012).
298. Id. at 835.
299. See M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 18 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (describing this
timeline).
300. See M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg, 675 F.3d at 836 (describing this procedure).
301. Id. at 839 (“Although the district court’s analysis may have been a reasonable
application of pre–Wal-Mart precedent, the Wal-Mart decision has heightened the standards for
establishing commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), rendering the district court’s analysis
insufficient.”); see also id. at 848 n.8 (“We acknowledge that [Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d
372, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam),] found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
certifying a similar class action. But the court did acknowledge that the proposed class
‘stretche[d] the notions of commonality and typicality,’ . . . and it was decided before the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Wal-Mart.” (citation omitted)).
302. Id. at 838.
303. Id. As with Jamie S., aspects of the opinion suggest that the court’s real concern was
with the burdensomeness of the proposed remedy, rather than the fitness of the claims for class
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cure these deficiencies by creating subclasses, each corresponding to a
discrete legal claim and a commensurate request for relief, the district
court would need to perform the required “rigorous analysis” as to
304
each subclass.
After engaging in additional discovery, the plaintiffs filed a new
motion for class certification several months later, and the district
court held a three-day hearing on the motion in January 2013. In
support of their respective positions for and against certification, the
parties presented extensive evidence, including expert testimony and
reports, live and written testimony from individuals involved in the
Texas foster-care system, and the foster-care agency’s internal
305
documents. Several more months passed before the district court
again granted class certification, announcing its decision in a sixty306
one-page order.
In addition to the more extensive evidence
considered and the more detailed analysis conducted (as compared to
the certification order issued seventeen months earlier), the new
order set forth a number of subclasses in addition to the original,
307
general class of Texas foster children.
The purpose of this
subclassing was not to address actual or potential conflicts within the
class, but to match the scope of each subclass with the scope of each
discrete claim and potential remedy, in accordance with the Fifth
308
Circuit’s directive.
Defendants again attempted to appeal the class-certification
order under Rule 23(f), but they missed the filing deadline, causing
309
the Fifth Circuit to reject the effort. A bench trial on the merits of
the plaintiff’s claims took place in December 2014. The issues
addressed at that trial—for example, “whether [the challenged]

treatment. See id. at 841 n.3 (“[I]t is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to
shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the
Constitution.” (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1996))); id. at 845 (“The proposed
class seeks at least twelve broad, classwide injunctions, which would require the district court to
institute and oversee a complete overhaul of Texas’s foster care system.”).
304. Id. at 848.
305. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 36–38 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
306. The plaintiffs’ motion was denied in part; one of the proposed subclasses could not be
certified because its representatives had left the foster system during the lengthy certification
dispute. Id. at 62–63. The district court permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to
include substituted representatives for that subclass, and authorized discovery as to those newly
named representatives. Id. at 63–65.
307. Id. at 30–31.
308. Id. at 56, 59, 61–62 (identifying potential remedies corresponding to each subclass).
309. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 547 F. App’x 543, 544 (5th Cir. 2013).
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policies subject class members to an unreasonable risk of harm, and
whether that risk is so unreasonable as to rise to a constitutional
310
violation” —were essentially the same as they would have been in
February 2013.
311
The trial court recently decided the case in the children’s favor.
Its opinion emphasized the harms that the children have experienced
over a period of many years:
[The Texas Department of Family Services (“DFPS”)] has ignored
20 years of reports, outlining problems and recommending solutions.
DFPS has also ignored professional standards. All the while, Texas’s
[long-term foster-care] children have been shuttled throughout a
system where rape, abuse, psychotropic medication, and instability
312
are the norm.

The court found that these harms have continued during the time the
313
lawsuit has been pending.
The delay in M.D. flowed directly from the across-the-board
changes that the current class-action debate has produced. The
defendants were able to appeal because of the adoption of Rule
314
23(f), the appellate court deemed the district court’s analysis
insufficient because of newly heightened evidentiary and
315
commonality requirements, and the appellate decision was itself
delayed by the need to await and respond to the doctrinal changes
316
introduced by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. Yet it is unclear what
values, if any, have been served by the more formalistic but
substantively equivalent analysis that resulted. Nothing about the
history of this case demonstrates any clear benefit with regard to
settlement pressure, attorney overcompensation, delay and expense,

310. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg, 294 F.R.D. at 45.
311. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, No. 2:11-cv-00084 (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.
childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2015-12-17-Memo-opinion-and-verdict-of-thecourt-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/B28L-EXTR].
312. Id. at 255.
313. The court rejected the defendants’ assertions that they had made meaningful
improvements to the foster-care system, stating that “[o]f the two reforms to which DFPS
pointed . . . one was instituted in the wake of this lawsuit, the other is an abject failure, and
neither answers any of Plaintiffs’ claims.” Id.
314. See supra Part III.A.
315. See supra Part III.B, III.E.
316. See supra note 301.
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317

or any other topic embraced by the current class-action debate.
Indeed, as to delay and expense, there has been a clear detriment.
This increase in delay and expense implicates the concerns about
transaction costs discussed previously. That is, increases in the
transaction costs of injunctive civil-rights class actions have the effect
of further suppressing a type of litigation that is already suppressed
318
by market forces. Concerns about transaction costs may have
particular relevance to the M.D. litigation—the plaintiffs, like
plaintiffs in many class actions seeking only injunctive or declaratory
319
relief, were represented by a nonprofit legal organization.
C. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
As the foregoing discussion of delay would suggest, the recent
restrictions on class treatment create structural disincentives for
plaintiffs to use the class-action device. Those disincentives have
particular relevance in cases seeking purely injunctive or declaratory
relief against a defendant’s generally applicable policy or practice,
because a plaintiff bringing such a claim must decide whether to
pursue class treatment or whether to instead bring the claim on a
320
formally individual basis.
As I have argued elsewhere, difficult problems can arise when a
plaintiff chooses to challenge a defendant’s generally applicable
321
policy or practice on a nonclass basis. For example, consider the
lengthy and ongoing litigation in Fisher v. University of Texas at
322
323
Austin. The plaintiff brought the lawsuit only on her own behalf,
317. See supra Part II.
318. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the particular
sources of increased transaction costs in injunctive civil-rights class actions, see supra Part
III.A–C.
319. Three law firms, working on a pro bono basis, joined nonprofit Children’s Rights, Inc.
in representing the plaintiffs. See Press Release, Children’s Rights, Inc., National Advocates and
Texas Attorneys File Federal Class Action Seeking Reform of Texas Child Welfare System
(Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.childrensrights.org/press-release/national-advocates-and-texasattorneys-file-federal-class-action-seeking-reform-of-texas-child-welfare-system [http://perma.
cc/YG5F-25ZS] (identifying Children’s Rights, Inc., Haynes and Boone, Yetter Coleman, and
Canales & Simonson as plaintiffs’ counsel).
320. See Carroll, supra note 28, at 2024–27. Depending on the nature of the plaintiff’s claim
and the defendant’s conduct, class treatment may be available under the injunctive civil-rights
subtype, the logical-indivisibility subtype, or both.
321. Id.
322. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
323. Shortly after the filing of the original complaint, a second individual plaintiff joined the
lawsuit, but that plaintiff is no longer involved in the litigation. See Second Amended Complaint
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but sought to stop the defendant from making race-conscious
admissions decisions with regard to all applicants to its undergraduate
324
program. If the defendant ultimately prevails on the merits, its
victory will have preclusive effect only with regard to the individual
plaintiff. Accordingly, as a matter of preclusion, the university will
remain subject to further litigation on the identical issues decided in
325
its favor. Under the original posture of the case, however, a win for
the plaintiff could have resulted in a sweeping order restructuring the
326
defendant’s admissions program. These potential outcomes created

for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at ¶ 1, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F.
Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No.A-08-CA-263-SS), 2008 WL 7318510 (identifying the
additional plaintiff).
324. Id. (seeking “to preliminarily and permanently enjoin [the defendants] from employing
racially discriminatory policies and procedures in administering the undergraduate admissions
program at the University of Texas at Austin”).
325. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008) (holding that, apart from class actions
and other limited exceptions, “one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process” (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940))); see also Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131
S. Ct. 2368, 2381 (2011) (“[T]he rule against nonparty preclusion . . . perforce leads to
relitigation of many issues . . . .”). As a matter of precedent, there may be a bar to relitigation of
legal issues decided in the initial case. The existence of such a bar will depend on numerous
factors, including the original plaintiff’s decision whether to appeal and the appellate court’s
decision whether to issue an “unpublished” (nonprecedential) decision. See Carroll, supra note
28, at 2052 & n.202.
326. The plaintiff initially had standing to seek forward-looking relief only because the
Supreme Court has defined the injury to plaintiffs challenging affirmative-action plans as the
“inability to compete on an equal footing” with members of the group that the affirmative
action plan aims to benefit. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v.
City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993). This definition of a constitutionally cognizable
injury is in tension with the Court’s standing jurisprudence outside of the affirmative-action
context, and it has garnered a great deal of criticism. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty
the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative Action Cases? Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the
Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 77, 78 (2012) (noting that
“procedural requirements concerning the Court’s ability to adjudicate the merits of disputes
have played out with particular incoherence, if not result-orientation, in affirmative action
lawsuits”); Maureen Carroll, Racialized Assumptions and Constitutional Harm: Claims of Injury
Based on Public School Assignment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 903, 919–21 (2011) (discussing the
tensions between standing decisions in affirmative-action cases and other school-assignment
cases); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination,
Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 81 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s affirmativeaction cases “reflect[] a doctrinal move towards converting efforts to rectify racial inequality
into white racial injury”); Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic
of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1048–49 (2002) (criticizing the Court for
“unduly magnifying the practical harm suffered by white applicants” in affirmative-action cases
and failing to recognize that “the admission of minority applicants and the rejection of white
applicants are largely independent events”).
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327

a preclusive asymmetry to the detriment of the defendant. Had the
plaintiff brought the case as a class action, the stakes could have been
more evenly aligned; after certification, a win for the defendant would
328
have generated class-wide preclusion in its favor.
Developments during the Fisher litigation ruled out the
possibility of a structural injunction, or indeed any forward-looking
remedies. Before the Fifth Circuit decided her initial appeal, the
plaintiff disclaimed any intent to reapply to the defendant’s
329
undergraduate program. Before the Supreme Court issued its
decision, the plaintiff had graduated from college, ruling out any
330
remaining possibility that she would reapply. These circumstances
331
rendered moot the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief. At the time
it reached the Supreme Court, the case had been pending for more
than eight years, but it could result in no injunctive or declaratory
relief. At most, a court could award damages for any harm the
332
plaintiff had individually suffered.
On remand, the Fifth Circuit expressed doubt as to the
availability of even a damages remedy, due to the plaintiff’s apparent
333
lack of standing to seek monetary relief. The court decided the
merits of the case in the defendant’s favor, but in doing so, it

327. Carroll, supra note 28, at 2052–55.
328. Id. at 2052. Class treatment would have had benefits for the plaintiff as well. Indeed,
some have asserted that the plaintiff erred by not bringing the case as a class action. See, e.g.,
Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) To Bring an Affirmative-Action Challenge, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 85, 87 (2012); Erwin Chemerinsky, What’s Next for Affirmative Action?, ABA J. (Aug.
6, 2013, 2:25 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_whats_next_for_
affirmative_action [http:// perma.cc/LDG7-YRQN].
329. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the
plaintiff could not seek forward-looking relief because she had no intention of reapplying to the
defendant’s undergraduate program).
330. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 4812586, at *5 (showing Justice Sotomayor’s comment that the
plaintiff could not seek injunctive relief because she had graduated).
331. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–07 (1983) (requiring a
“real and immediate” threat of future injury to establish standing for injunctive relief).
332. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 217.
333. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.
Ct. 2888 (2015). The Supreme Court has again granted certiorari, and UT Austin has devoted
seven pages of its merits brief to the argument that Fisher lacks standing. See Brief for
Respondents at 17–24, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981, 2015 WL 6467640; see also
Richard M. Re, Does Fisher I Establish Jurisdiction for Fisher II?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 17,
2015, 8:25 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/11/does-fisher-i-establishjurisdiction-for-fisher-ii.html [http://perma.cc/FQ2Z-YWS5] (discussing UT Austin’s standing
arguments).
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suggested that it may have issued an unconstitutional advisory
334
opinion. In terms of judicial economy and legitimacy, this result is
hardly an optimal one. Had the plaintiff brought a class action, this
strain on the courts’ resources and authority could have been
avoided: even after the plaintiff’s individual claim had become moot,
she would have been able to continue seeking injunctive and
335
declaratory relief on behalf of the class.
Like the plaintiff in Fisher, plaintiffs in many other recent cases
have chosen not to pursue class treatment when challenging a
defendant’s generally applicable policy or practice; notwithstanding
the absence of class treatment, these cases address matters of
336
widespread significance.
It is not possible to draw a direct
connection between the plaintiff’s decision in any one of those cases
and the across-the-board barriers that the current class-action debate
337
has produced. Yet simple logic suggests that making class treatment
more difficult will cause fewer plaintiffs to pursue it, especially when
another option appears to be available. The undifferentiated
constraints on class actions thus contribute to the harms and
inefficiencies involved in these types of nonclass cases.
In sum, courts now refuse to certify class actions that would
readily have achieved certification in 1966, causing the loss of some of
the benefits that the authors of the 1966 revisions sought to capture.
Class treatment of injunctive and declaratory claims under the civilrights subtype was designed to promote remedial efficacy and the rule

334. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 640 (acknowledging that the defendant’s “standing arguments carry
force,” but interpreting the Supreme Court’s mandate to decide the merits of the case as a bar
to considering whether the plaintiff lacked standing).
335. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 402–03 (1975).
336. See generally Carroll, supra note 28, at 2039–48 (discussing the disincentives to pursuing
class treatment and their impact on important litigation). For example, consider the recent
litigation over marriage rights for same-sex couples: the majority of those cases, including the
cases that ultimately reached the Supreme Court, proceeded on a nonclass basis. See, e.g.,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). The
absence of class treatment caused significant problems—including confusion over remedial
scope, and tension between federal and state courts—in several states, including Alabama. See,
e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama: But Not for the Reasons Everyone Thinks,
JURIST (Mar. 14, 2015, 11:22 AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2015/03/howard-wasserman-alabamamarriage.php [http://perma.cc/4ZEN-B3DW] (describing the “uncertain, inefficient and even
ugly” manner in which same-sex marriage came to Alabama, including procedural moves and
counter-moves by the Alabama Supreme Court and the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama).
337. See supra Part III.
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of law—as the Fisher example suggests, its absence can give rise to
338
difficult problems of preclusive asymmetry and judicial inefficiency.
Similarly, when cases seeking logically indivisible relief proceed in the
absence of class treatment, they expose courts and defendants to the
risk of inconsistent judgments. And when cases seeking distribution
of a limited fund proceed individually, they jeopardize the interests of
those who obtain their judgments last. Whatever limitations might be
justified for those subtypes should be imposed intentionally, after
reasoned analysis of their particular costs and benefits, and not as a
spillover effect of concerns about a separate class form.
V. BEYOND MYOPIA: BROADENING THE DISCUSSION
A myopic focus on the aggregated-damages subtype has impeded
courts’ and litigants’ ability to achieve the full potential of the
structure set forth in the class-action rule, particularly for those
situations in which the need for class treatment has long been well
recognized. As this Part explains, a broader discussion would take
into account all of the purposes served by the class-action rule, and all
of the subtypes it contains.
A. Disaggregating the Concerns, Differentiating the Responses
To achieve the necessary broadening of the discussion, debates
over the costs and benefits of class actions must consistently address
two neglected questions. First, does a particular concern about “the
class action” actually apply in the context of subtypes other than the
aggregated-damages class action, and if so, how? As suggested by the
earlier discussions of settlement pressure and the logical-indivisibility
339
subtype; attorney overcompensation and the injunctive civil-rights
340
341
subtype; and delay, expense, and the limited-fund subtype; the
concerns that courts, lawmakers, and scholars have identified in the
context of the aggregated-damages class action can play out very
differently in the context of other class forms. Each subtype therefore
requires separate analysis with regard to the salience of each
particular concern.

338.
339.
340.
341.

See Carroll, supra note 28, at 2052–68.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
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Second, if a concern does arise in the context of another subtype,
will denying class treatment effectively address it, and will it do so
without generating countervailing concerns? The current class-action
debate generally relies on an underlying assumption that denying
certification usually does represent an effective response to concerns
about class treatment. This assumption itself arises from the context
of the aggregated-damages class action, where denying certification
can be expected to lead to the abandonment of individually low-value
claims and the nonclass litigation of individually high-value claims. In
other contexts, however, the absence of class treatment may permit or
342
even exacerbate the threatened harm. Tailoring the conduct of class
proceedings to the problem at issue may therefore present a better
343
institutional response.
Though the problem of class-action myopia is wide-reaching in
scope and effect, the solution can be simply stated: courts and
lawmakers should stop imposing undifferentiated limitations on the
availability of class treatment unless they conclude that (1) the
concerns motivating a particular limitation actually apply to each of
the class-action subtypes and (2) the concerns can be uniformly
resolved by the denial of class treatment. If this solution were
adopted, it would result in more effective and conceptually coherent
standards for the conduct of class actions.
B. Converting to Subtype-Differentiated Standards
Achieving the necessary recalibration of class-action law will not
only require changing the approach that courts and lawmakers take
going forward, when evaluating new restrictions on class actions, it
will also require reevaluating the restrictions that courts and
lawmakers have already imposed. That reevaluation should include a
consideration of which of the recent across-the-board changes, if any,

342. See Rhode, supra note 289, at 1196.
343. See Carroll, supra note 28, at 2074–83. For example, a proposed injunctive civil-rights
class action may present concerns about agency costs because of ideological disagreements
among members of the class. Id. at 2080–81. Denying certification on the basis of those
concerns, however, could leave the plaintiff free to seek a system-wide remedy in the nonclass
case, regardless of whether that remedy were the one that other class members would prefer.
See supra note 289. Accordingly, a court hearing such a case might better respond to concerns
about agency costs by inviting broader intervention or amicus participation in the remedial
phase of the proceedings. This would be especially true if the court viewed the case as likely to
result in a wide-reaching precedent or a system-wide remedy. See Carroll, supra note 28, at
2081–82.
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should be converted via rulemaking into subtype-differentiated
344
standards.
In particular, the rulemaking committees should consider
revising Rule 23 to create subtype-differentiated standards for
interlocutory appeals, evidentiary burdens, and ascertainability. With
345
regard to interlocutory appeals, the rationale for Rule 23(f) relied
almost entirely on concerns about settlement pressure and the “death
knell” thesis. As explained earlier, those concerns are strongly rooted
in the aggregated-damages class action, and have little to no salience
346
outside that context. An additional motivation for the provision was
to facilitate the development of appellate law on class certification,
which is a valid purpose regardless of subtype. But interlocutory
review appears to be less important to achieving that purpose in the
context of the traditional subtypes than in the context of the
aggregated-damages class action. This difference exists because, in
the absence of in terrorem settlement concerns, the class certification
decision can be effectively reviewed as part of an appeal from the
final judgment—or, at least, it can be reviewed as effectively as any
347
other pretrial ruling subject to the final judgment rule. Moreover, as
noted previously, interlocutory review can increase the time and
348
effort required for litigation under the traditional subtypes, creating
a detriment that weighs against the potential benefit of the
development of appellate law. Accordingly, Rule 23(f) should be
revised to permit interlocutory appeals from certification decisions
349
only under the aggregated-damages subtype.
With regard to evidentiary burdens, concerns about settlement
pressure have provided the bulk of the motivation for recent judicial
344. By “subtype-differentiated standards” I mean class-action procedures or requirements
that apply differently depending on the subtype at issue. For example, in its current form, the
class-action rule requires a court to order notice to class members when granting certification
under the aggregated-damages subtype, but gives the court discretion whether to order such
notice when granting certification under the other subtypes. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A)–(B).
The rule thus imposes subtype-differentiated standards for class notice.
345. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting
or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed
with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.”).
346. See supra Part II.A.
347. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, discussed supra Part IV.A, is an example of a
case in which such review occurred.
348. See supra Part IV.B.
349. I have argued elsewhere that Rule 23(f) should not apply in cases involving purely
injunctive or declaratory relief under the civil-rights subtype. See Carroll, supra note 28, at
2075–76.
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decisions raising the standard of proof required for class
350
certification. As Robert Bone has noted, these decisions are “thin
on careful analysis” and have “fail[ed] to seriously engage the
competing policies at stake,” particularly as those policies vary with
351
the type of class action involved. A robust rulemaking process
should fill that gap, creating a set of evidentiary standards that reflect
the different costs and benefits associated with each subtype.
Although the particular evidentiary standards to be adopted are
beyond the scope of this Article, the situating of concerns within the
aggregated-damages subtype suggests that a higher evidentiary
standard would be appropriate under that subtype as compared to the
others.
Indeed, it may make sense to revise the injunctive civil-rights
subtype so that it permits certification based on no greater showing
352
than that required to establish the plaintiffs’ standing.
This
certification burden would not relieve plaintiffs of the obligation to
prove the merits of their claims or the appropriateness of their
proposed remedy at later stages in the litigation, but it would help to
avoid scenarios in which courts never reach the merits of widely held
353
claims at all. Further, such a standard would reduce the delays
354
involved in obtaining class certification, and would thereby help to
avoid scenarios in which plaintiffs proceed through the personally less
burdensome, but institutionally less desirable, nonclass path toward a
355
structural injunction.
Finally, it would promote preclusive
symmetry, as a postcertification merits decision would bind class
members to a determination that the defendant did not in fact engage
356
in the alleged policy or practice. Current law does not generally
provide for that binding effect, because class members can be bound

350. Bone, supra note 182, at 1110.
351. Bone, supra note 134, at 112–14.
352. David Marcus introduced this argument in the context of public-interest class actions
brought pursuant to the injunctive civil-rights subtype. See Marcus, Public Interest, supra note 38
(manuscript at 58) (“The evidentiary burden at class certification for public interest plaintiffs
[under Rule 23(b)(2)] should equal the evidentiary burden a plaintiff would bear to establish
standing . . . .”).
353. See supra Part IV.A.
354. See supra Part IV.B.
355. See supra Parts IV.C.
356. See supra notes 322–27 and accompanying text.
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only through class certification, and a finding that the defendant did
358
not engage in the alleged policy or practice can defeat certification.
With regard to ascertainability, the problem is less that courts
have created an undifferentiated standard and more that, due to their
myopic focus on aggregated-damages class actions, they have lost
sight of the differentiation that the rule was intended to include from
359
the start. As noted earlier, the Advisory Committee note to the
1966 revisions recognized that the members of a class certified under
the injunctive civil-rights subtype would “usually” be “incapable of
360
specific enumeration.” Nothing in the text of the rule, however,
explicitly codifies the subtype-differentiated understanding of
361
ascertainability set forth in the note. Accordingly, the rulemaking
committees should modify the text so that it imposes a looser
ascertainability requirement for injunctive civil-rights and logicalindivisibility class actions than for aggregated-damages and limitedfund class actions.
C. Highlighting History
Courts will be more likely to embrace an appropriately subtypedifferentiated analysis if lawmakers, scholars, and litigants draw their
362
attention to the historical origins of the traditional subtypes, and to
the longstanding history of creating and acknowledging doctrinal
differences between those subtypes and the aggregated-damages class
363
action.

357. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380 (2011). But see Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Multiple Attempts at Class Certification, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 137, 141 (2014) (arguing against
“the suggestion in Bayer that the current version of Rule 23 would foreclose a district court
from ever employing procedures designed to give a denial of certification binding effect”).
358. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552–54 (2011).
359. See supra Part III.C.
360. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
361. Indeed, nothing in the text of the rule explicitly codifies any requirement of
ascertainability. The text onto which the ascertainability requirement has been engrafted states
only that “[a]n order that certifies a class action must define the class and the class claims,
issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel under Rule 23(g).” FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(1)(B).
362. Recent scholarship has greatly enhanced the tools available for understanding and
illuminating these historical origins. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions for Monetary
Relief Under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B): Does Due Process Require Notice and Opt-Out
Rights?, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 810–22 (2014); Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24,
at 671–711; Marcus, History, supra note 48, at 600–22.
363. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A)–(B) (creating different notice and opt-out
requirements for aggregated-damages class actions versus the other class forms); Phillips
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in particular, has emphasized the
importance of history to the interpretation and application of the
364
class-action rule. Yet dicta in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes suggest
that the Court has lost sight of a crucial aspect of that history,
involving the origins and purposes of the injunctive civil-rights class
365
action. The Court acknowledged, as it had before, that “‘[c]ivil
rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, class-based
discrimination are prime examples’ of what (b)(2) is meant to
366
capture.” Yet it went on to assert that the “justification[] for class
treatment” pursuant to the injunctive civil-rights subtype is “that the
367
relief sought must perforce affect the entire class at once” —in other
368
words, that the relief in such cases is “indivisible.”
If taken literally, the Wal-Mart Court’s assertion about the
purpose of the injunctive civil-rights class action cannot be squared
369
with the history of that provision, which was motivated in part by
the problem that the relief in desegregation cases was not logically
indivisible, permitting district courts to enter “meaningless,
370
individual-by-individual injunctions” instead of structural relief. As
Benjamin Kaplan wrote during the drafting process,
If a school desegregation case, for example, is maintained by an
individual on his own behalf, rather than as a class action, very likely
the relief will be confined to admission of the individual to the

Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985) (acknowledging implicitly that the
procedural-due-process analysis differs for aggregated-damages class actions versus the other
class forms).
364. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–58 (2011); Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833–45 (1999); Wolff, supra note 251, at 1040 (noting that the
Wal-Mart Court “discusse[d] the history and origins of Rule 23 as a lens through which to
scrutinize the proper function of subsection (b)(2)”).
365. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997).
366. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–58 (alteration in original) (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at
614).
367. Id. at 2558.
368. See id. at 2557 (“The key to the (b)(2) class is ‘the indivisible nature of the injunctive or
declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or
declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.’” (quoting
Nagareda, supra note 247, at 132)).
369. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court articulated the purpose of the injunctive civil-rights
subtype in a more historically consistent way. For example, it accords with historical practice to
state (as the Court did in Wal-Mart) that “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or
declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at
2557.
370. Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 710.
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school and will not encompass broad corrective measures—
371
desegregation of the school. This would be unfortunate. . . .

The history of desegregation litigation, and its role in the drafting of
the injunctive civil-rights class action, thus refutes the Court’s
assertion that the relief in such cases “must perforce affect the entire
372
class at once.”
As this example suggests, the proper interpretation of the classaction rule—including the appropriate analysis of subtypedifferentiated standards embodied within the rule—may require
greater efforts to bring the Court back to the historical origins of the
traditional subtypes, especially with regard to the injunctive civilrights class action.
CONCLUSION
In interpreting and modifying procedural law, courts and
lawmakers must move beyond the erroneous assumption that all class
forms entail the same challenges and concerns as the aggregateddamages class action, which is the newest and most controversial of
the subtypes captured in the modern class-action rule. If those
decisionmakers continue with their current level of class-action
myopia, many of the intended benefits of the device’s other forms will
ultimately be lost. Regardless of what restrictions the aggregateddamages class action may warrant, those restrictions should not be
permitted to destroy the utility of the other mechanisms that the
class-action rule creates.

371. Id. at 700 (alteration in original). Kaplan added that “if the action is not maintained as
a class action, the contempt remedy would presumably not be available to anyone but the
individual plaintiff, and others in similar position could be put to separate proceedings with
ensuing delay.” Id. at 700–01.
372. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558. One way of squaring this circle is to read the Court as
referring not to logical indivisibility, but to what might be termed precedential indivisibility—the
notion that the liability question cannot be decided differently for different members of the
class, making the resulting precedent legally and factually indistinguishable in cases brought by
similarly situated claimants. Richard Nagareda, on whose scholarship the Wal-Mart Court
relied, appears to have originally intended this meaning of indivisibility. See Richard A.
Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
149, 180 (2003) (“Absent demands for damages, the liability issue—whether the defendant’s
generally applicable conduct deviates from the governing legal standard—is indivisible in the
sense that the defendant’s conduct is either lawful or unlawful as to everyone it affects.”).

